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cc-licenses - Re: [cc-licenses] The scope of the term "work" (Case study: Magnatune)

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Subject: Development of Creative Commons licenses

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  • From: Peter Brink <peter.brink AT brinkdata.se>
  • To: Discussion on the Creative Commons license drafts <cc-licenses AT lists.ibiblio.org>
  • Subject: Re: [cc-licenses] The scope of the term "work" (Case study: Magnatune)
  • Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2005 22:02:09 +0100

Given the volume of this thread I've chosen to respond to the tread rather than to any individual contributions to the tread.

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What seems to be the issue here is how to understand the term "work" in the cc-license; is the term "work" as used in the license the same as the copyright concept "work"?

It should be noted that there are (at least) three different variants of the concept of "work" under international copyright law: the continental European version, the U.K. version and the U.S. version. In day to day life these operate in quite similar ways but the theoretical foundations of the three are different. I will not present any further comments on this issue, but merely note that that this is something one has to keep in mind.

The only thing we are told in the license text about the "work" is that it's "the copyrightable work of authorship offered under the terms of this License" (art 1.e). This does seem to imply that the license covers the work in all its present, past and future forms.

However, in 4.a and b we learn that "[y]ou must include a copy of, or the Uniform Resource Identifier for, this License with every copy or phonorecord of the Work You distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform", i.e. a copy of a licensed work _must_ have a license statement attached. If someone happens to find a copy of a work, which he knows is licensed under a cc-license, and that copy lacks the proper license statement; then he is wrong in assuming that this copy is available for use under the license. A copy _must_ have a license statement attached for it to be legal to use it under the terms of the license. It is not intended that all copies of a licensed work, regardless of whether they have a license statement attached or not, should be available for use under the terms of the license.

It does seems fair, I think, to say that most licensors probably intend that only those copies of his work that do have a license statement attached, should be available for use under the license. For example, assume that an author publishes a printed book. A few months later he publishes the same text (i.e. the same work) formatted as a PDF-document under the CC-BY license. Does that mean that his intention is that the book also should be free to copy and distribute freely? Most likely not, I say. IMO there is no need to assume that the licensor intends to give away any more rights than needed to make the license work.

If we study the FAQ and the "Things to think about before you apply a Creative Commons license to your work" document available at "http://creativecommons.org/about/think"; the text repeatedly states that the license is non-exclusive and that the licensor is free to license the work under any other terms he likes if he wishes to. This certainly enforces the notion that only those copies of a work that has a license statement attached are available under the license.

I think it's fair to state that a CC-license (as most other open source and open content licenses) is a unilateral beneficial legal act, a gift. There are no mutual obligations and the licensor offers the licensee to use his work with no obligations attached. One may of course attach terms to a unilateral beneficial legal act, as the cc-license does. However, this does not change the legal classification. Under these circumstances, would a court choose to interpret the terms of the license restrictively, in favour of the licensor or extensively, in favour of the licensee?

When we are dealing with unilateral beneficial legal acts the apparent will or intentions of the benefactor become important for our interpretation of the terms attached to the gift. This would tend to act in favour of interpreting the terms of the license restrictively, in favour of the licensor. On the other hand, the licensor has not drafted the terms of the license, he might not even fully understand the meaning and consequences of the terms; this would tend to lessen the "homeward" trend. Ultimately the court would have to base its ruling on the language of the license and the apparent intentions of the licensor. Where I live (in Sweden) I'm pretty confident that a court would choose a restrictive interpretation. The license only needs to define "work" as "the physical copy of a work which has a license statement attached to it" to be able to operate as intended.

To sum up: IMHO the term "work" in the license should _not_ be interpreted as having the same scope as the concept "work" has under copyright law. By "work" we should IMO mean "the physical copy of a work which has a license statement attached to it". We don't need a more powerful "work" concept than that.


/Peter Brink






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