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  • From: Jerry Sumney <jsumney AT lextheo.edu>
  • To: 'Corpus-paul' <corpus-paul AT franklin.oit.unc.edu>
  • Subject: RE: C-P: Paul and Plato
  • Date: Fri, 30 Jul 1999 03:12:41 -0400


Liz and Jeffrey,

I have been away a couple of weeks and so have just now seen your renewal
of the question of "spiritual body" and of Platonism. May I commend again
Dale Martin's _The Corinthian Body_? I think he show clearly that there
are ways that this expression makes sense in a hellenized world. But
surely not everyone in this hellenized world is a Platonist. What Martin
shows is that there were levels of spirit and matter between pure spirit
and pure matter. This is not surprising, but the different types of
existence present in various levels is often not considered in discussions
of Paul's views--especially those of the resurrection body. I think the
belief in these different levels means you could have something like an
incorruptible body which was not just spirit.

By the way, I don't think the Corinthians actually asked what sort of
body
it would be, that is Paul's preemptive strike against a question which he
thinks would be asked to ridicule his view. I think the Corinthians Paul
is writing against here are denying a bodily resurrection and asserting
that the afterlife is the immortality of the soul. So Paul must support is
assertion that there is a bodily existence after death with these
explanations.

Anyway, the basic points I wanted to make were that spirit and matter
are
not completely separate at all levels so that a "spiritual body" might make
more sense than it seems to at first blush AND not everyone influenced by
hellenism has to be a platonist (just as the other schools of philosophy).

Jerry

Jerry L. Sumney
Lexington Theological Seminary
631 S. Limestone
Lexington, KY 40508
jsumney AT lextheo.edu
(606) 252-0361






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