bluesky AT lists.ibiblio.org
Subject: Global-Scale Distributed Storage Systems
List archive
- From: <lucas AT gonze.com>
- To: Global-Scale Distributed Storage Systems <bluesky AT franklin.oit.unc.edu>
- Subject: Re: Grapevine Technical Overview
- Date: Mon, 27 May 2002 15:13:23 -0400 (EDT)
> Once they've done that
> it is simply a question of finding out (e.g., by making grapevine requests
> for forbidden blocks, or through more physical "break down the door"
> techniques) who is requesting, hosting or relaying these blocks and cart
> them off to jail.
>
> Is there a way to foil this kind of attack?
>
> Ihor.
A way to foil this attack, just not in the context of distributed hash
tables:
Spam out samizdat materials, so that people who don't want them get them,
but people who do want them also get them.
A way to do it in the context of distributed hash tables:
Use a hash algorithm where can you predict some container nodes but not
all. For example, publish an item under different names. Then a consumer
can find one copy given the name, but the attacker can only take down
one node at a time.
-
Re: Grapevine Technical Overview
, (continued)
- Re: Grapevine Technical Overview, Bram Cohen, 05/22/2002
- Re: Grapevine Technical Overview, Oskar Sandberg, 05/22/2002
- Re: Grapevine Technical Overview, Stephen Blackheath, 05/22/2002
- Re: Grapevine Technical Overview, Anthony Jones, 05/23/2002
- Re: Grapevine Technical Overview, Oskar Sandberg, 05/23/2002
- Re: Grapevine Technical Overview, Stephen Blackheath, 05/23/2002
- Re: Grapevine Technical Overview, Zooko, 05/23/2002
- Re: Grapevine Technical Overview, Bram Cohen, 05/23/2002
- Re: Grapevine Technical Overview, melc, 05/27/2002
- Re: Grapevine Technical Overview, Oskar Sandberg, 05/27/2002
- Re: Grapevine Technical Overview, lucas, 05/27/2002
- Re: Grapevine Technical Overview, Andrei Serjantov, 05/28/2002
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