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b-hebrew - Re: Conceptual Metaphor Theory & Hebrew

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  • From: "M & E Anstey" <anstey AT raketnet.nl>
  • To: "Biblical Hebrew" <b-hebrew AT franklin.oit.unc.edu>
  • Subject: Re: Conceptual Metaphor Theory & Hebrew
  • Date: Sun, 12 Nov 2000 23:10:10 +0100


Dear Liz and Brian,

Some comments on metaphor:
>
> > Dear Brian,
> > This is a fascinating topic!
> > Does the article discuss how to recognize metaphor
> > or allegory and how to recognize when the biblical writer is being
> literal?
>
> 1. Reading through a given Hebrew text metaphors may be recognized when
one
> thing is said to another in the formula A is B, or even understood to be
> another, where only B is mentioned.

The problem with this sort of definition of metaphor is that it is too
strong, as it includes referential, identificational and other semantic
predications of the form 'A is B'. Furthermore, in both of your emails the
concept of "metaphor" is used as a single entity when it is known to be a
scalar concept, with at least 4 major prototypical metaphor-types on the
scale, ranging from dead to acitve metaphors at either end. This scale is
often referred to as "the cline of conventionality". The question is, for
any given metaphor, where is it on the cline? Furthermore, it is not hard to
make a case that non-native readers of texts, ie in this case us, can often
not locate metaphors on this cline. For example, when Jesus said "take up
your cross" this *appears* to be an active metaphor, since there is no
comparable statement in all extant Greek literature. It may be then that
Jesus said something here totally new. But we simply cannot tell in many
cases, unless there are many comparable examples.


>
> 2. Metaphors may also be recognized by the use of verbs, which describe an
> action not normally associated with the subject or the object, thus
> suggesting that the subject or object in the sentence is being understood
as
> the subject or object which is normally associated with that verb, i.e.
> normal subject or object of the verb is unusual subject or object of the
> verb, which, through a process of logical reasoning, can also be reduced
to
> the formual A is B. By doing a semantic analysis of the subject mouns and
> the verbs and object nouns and the verbs, it becomes apparent whether or
not
> the noun is the usual or an unusual noun as the subject or object of that
> verb. Metaphors may then be detected by the semantic incompatibility of
the
> verbs and nouns, whether subject or object, within a particular syntactic
> combination.

Again, this definition is only one idea among many. A lot depends on the
definition of "unusual". There are two major theories - the attribute model
and the prototypical model. But the idea of "semantic incompatibility" is of
course central to metpahor theory.

However, one must distinguish carefully lexical incompatability and
interpretative incompatability. Lexical is as you described in above. By
interpretative incompatability I mean that recent research on the "live"
processing of metaphors in conversation and text suggests that normally
addressees do not notice any incompatibility with metaphors, and rarely even
notice metpahors at all. But in processing "context-less" examples they
notice them. In other words, our working memory rapidly (and I mean *really*
rapidly) finds the ground(s) for a metaphor and makes then the association.
This happens so fast that we don't realise we have processed a metaphor. For
example, when the Hebrew says, "The nose of David became very hot" and we
think it is highly metaphorical there are two points to consider. Firstly,
where is it on the cline? If it is a dead metaphor, which I think it is
since it is very common, then it would have been processed as a single
lexicon phrase and it does not even register as a metaphor and the working
memory would retrive this exact (partial) phrase from the mental lexicon.
SUppose, however, that it is alive and no-one had ever said this beofre in
BH. This is the second issue. TO use it creates little association so we are
delayed in our processing and so register it is a metpahor. But in the BH
lexicon, there could possibly be an association made so fast that even as an
brand new metaphor, it is not recognised as a metaphor. This is all
hypothetical of course. The point is to realise that metpahors uncovered by
careful reading of the text may not have been registered as metaphors by
mative readers, even if they are in fact lexical metaphors.

This is the big difference in detailed exegesis, which is an artificial way
of reading a text. Here metaphors are taken as big deals and books are
written on them. To native speakers they are like breathing.


Furthermore, metaphors should also be measured on the markedness scale. And
since most biblical metaphors are so familiar to us, they are all unmarked
in our reading. Retrieving markedness from a dead language is extremely
difficult, so it is hard for us to assess the markedness of biblical
metaphors.

>
> 3. Metaphors may further be recognized where there is structural
correlation
> in our daily experience, such as in the corresponding image-schematic
> concept Part/Whole, also know as metonymy...

>
>
>
> > Can we assume the Biblical writer is using metaphor
> > or allegory when he refers to YHWH scooping up clay
> > and making Adam, or should we assume he is being literal, i.e.,
> > that the literal is the conception of the author?

Another problem with metaphors here altogether, and this is the
lexicalisation of supernatural beings. This can vary even within a culture
quite considerably. For example, on standard accounts of metaphor, to say
"God parted the Red Sea" would probably be metaphoric. But among believing
communities this is not processed as metaphoric at all, since the range of
verbs associated in the mental lexicon as taking supernatural agents is
enourmous. But, if I said to you, "God deep-fried some whiting" it would
ironically trigger a metaphorical interpretation, not because it is more
difficult for God to do than parting the Red Sea, but because of the verb
choice. So, you need a whole separate theoretical module for dealing with
metaphors concerning supernatural beings.

Furthermore, and this is another big problem with supernatural beings and
other areas. Research has shown that in language use metaphors are often the
norm and non-metaphorical language use is often more marked or unusual. In
fact, many of the most significant lexical domains that are pertinent to
language use are almost exclusively described by metpahors. Without
metaphors in other words, we could not communciate very well about much that
is important to us. For example, in English, most desciprtions of emotive
states are described with metaphors from the domain of water, and a few from
the domain of light, but hardly any literal statements are made excpet in
marked linguistic environments such as cognitive psychotherapy sessions! We
describe relationships using the domain of electricity (eg sparks are
flying, our love is electric, etc), and we describe the domain of
electricity with the domain of movement (eg electons flow). Now, with
supernatural beings, we use metaphors to describe this domain. In Hebrew and
English this is mostly the domain of personhood, but also other domains are
used. So not only do we have supernatural beings interefering with the
lexicon, they also are mostly descirbed with metaphors. In fact, like
electricity, we wouldnot get very far without metaphors. This has nothing to
do *necessarily* with ontology, but some have made a connection. The point
is, that metaphors are simply not unusual or less clear ways of
communicating in any language, and that even new, active metaphors are often
not recognised by in actual language use or reading by native speakers.


> > I assume the author is being literal, and I am often accused of
> > underestimating
> > the biblical writers and of turning the bible into fairy tales.
> > Is this issue dealt with in the article you cite, or any article?
> > Do people have thoughts on this topic?
>

> It appears number 2 above may speak to this particular example. Is the
> action of the verb here normally associated with the subject and/or the
> object. It seems, how one answers that question determines if this may be
> seen as a metaphor or not.
>
> Does the context and the range or meaning of these words lead one to think
> (conceptualize) this passage is metaphorical?
>
> It would be interesting to know if Uagaritic has any similiar metaphorical
> descriptions concerning the divine, this would lend credibility to the
> "source-target domain mappings" in which the Hebrew would have been
> understood.

I would disagree respectfully with this. Take two languages that are almost
dialects, unlike Ugaratic and Hebrew, and you will find large areas of
unrelated metaphors. Comparative linguistics and metaphors is not a strong
position to argue from. Then again, you must realise that I do not hold much
belief in the arguemtns of comp. linguistics as are typically used in BH
linguistics, regardless of the topic. Take Dutch, German and English, all
Germanic languages, all spoken concurrently, all living languages. Choose
any single linguistic feature in one language see much you can
explain about it by studying the other two. Even lexical studies get you
not very far. "Week" in Dutch equals English "week", "centimeter" in Dutch
equals English "measuring tape". Or take the position of negators in Italian
dialects currently spoken in Italy. Some are
post-verbal others are pre-verbal. The examples are endless.


>
> So understanding the conceptual framework of a metaphor in one langauge
> could possibly help us understand the metaphor in our present context?


> How do we determine if the receptors of the original metaphor would have
> understood it?


>
> If something was to be understood metaphorically in the source language
> shouldn't one attempt to translate it metaphorically in the target
language?

See my comments above. I would only add that "monosemanticist theories of
metaphor, such as those found in standard translations texts from the 70s
and 80s, ie Louw and Nida, or Beekman and Callow, are highly questionable.
If by saying "understand the metaphor" you mean metaphors have a single
meaning, then I would not think this is true.

Regarding translations practice with metaphors, there are four main
strategies: literal, demetaphorisation, remetaphorisation, and explication.
These are hopefully self-explanatory. Translators also try to avoid
markedness shift
in dealing with metaphors. The choice of strategy is very much dependent on
the goal of the translation.


With regards,
Matthew Anstey
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam

>






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