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sm-discuss - Re: [SM-Discuss] STRONGER POLICY for gpg signatures to replace MD5[*] and ALSO new SOURCE_HASH support

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  • From: Eric Sandall <eric AT sandall.us>
  • To: "Sergey A. Lipnevich" <sergey AT optimaltec.com>
  • Cc: sm-discuss AT lists.ibiblio.org
  • Subject: Re: [SM-Discuss] STRONGER POLICY for gpg signatures to replace MD5[*] and ALSO new SOURCE_HASH support
  • Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2005 08:47:18 -0700 (PDT)

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On Mon, 29 Aug 2005, Sergey A. Lipnevich wrote:
Quoting Seth Alan Woolley <seth AT positivism.org>:

DRAFT, although this is one case where we're actually moving on it
quickly, so it's more of a last call for objections.


So here goes: I object.

1. Hash collision is not a problem when it comes to source tarballs, so please
don't use it as a reason to switch to signatures. We could've as easily hashed
them with CRC32 or with 10K-bit hash. *Either* way provides *no* security.

Care to explain? The nice part about GPG is that we can change
hashsums without changing which tool (GPG) we're using.

2. There's no way I can sign a bunch of code I didn't read through and
understand. It's an impossible task in a distribution, so it's shorter to say
that I can't sign a bunch of code, period.

You must have forgotten to read the prior conversations. We are /not/
guaranteeing that these files are trojan/virus/malware/whatever-free.
What we are guaranteeing is that the tarball the user downloaded is
the same as the one the guru tested with. Nothing less, nothing more.

3. Let's be frank Seth, tarballs that you, or anyone else besides the authors,
signed are as *insecure* as they were before you did that. It didn't format
your hard drive? Good for you. Maybe it's designed to format only *mine*. Or
the drive of the guy who works for CIA ot Chinese government. You don't know
that.

We have that problem now. Your point?

4. Combination of #2 and #3 leads me to believe that we do not provide *any*
additional security over unsigned tarballs, so let's focus on *integrity*.
Integrity is *perfectly* verified by the hash. Stronger hash if necessary, but
nevertheless a hash. Non-personified piece of information.
5. What people keep saying on the list amounts to: let's call it blue even
though it's black. Meaning, let's call GPG signature a means to verify
integrity even though it's a means to verify source and integrity. I don't buy
that.

Don't get me wrong, I believe that PGP and GPG are one of the most overlooked
technologies of the present time, in the light of PKI having so many
unresolved
and abandoned issues. So, I support use of GPG signatures, but for the correct
purpose. Verifying integrity of the source tarballs is not a sufficient
purpose.

Sergey.

You seem to have missed the entire conversation. That's exactly what
we've been saying the entire time and we've corrected people who
posted misunderstandings: GPG is being used to verify the tarball is
what the guru used, nothing more, nothing less.

- -sandalle

- --
Eric Sandall | Source Mage GNU/Linux Developer
eric AT sandall.us | http://www.sourcemage.org/
http://eric.sandall.us/ | SysAdmin @ Inst. Shock Physics @ WSU
http://counter.li.org/ #196285 | http://www.shock.wsu.edu/
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