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Re: [SM-Discuss] md5 checks / possibly compromised openssh tarball
- From: "Sergey A. Lipnevich" <sergeyli AT pisem.net>
- To: Eric Sandall <sandalle AT hellhound.homeip.net>
- Cc: sm-discuss AT lists.ibiblio.org
- Subject: Re: [SM-Discuss] md5 checks / possibly compromised openssh tarball
- Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2002 23:40:18 +0400 (MSD)
We mused over idea of compiling as underprivileged
account, like nobody, and only doing 'make install' as
root. It wouldn't protect from backdoors that persist
like the one in OpenSSH (man, why did they screw it so
badly? Are they on WU FTPd previous century version?),
but if the trojaned code is in the ./configure, it
would at least prevent some interaction. It may require
separating BUILD into BUILD and INSTALL scripts.
Additional benefit: people who forget to put
prepare_install inside BUILD will be protected from.
--Sergey.
Eric Sandall <sandalle AT hellhound.homeip.net>:
>
> Sergey A. Lipnevich said:
> > Julian, my friend,
> >
> > I agree that it's a help, but where's the action
here? Who's really
> > concerned about sorcery having this feature? And if
nobody finds out
> > about xyz.tar.gz being trojaned because it's not in
such a wide use, how
> > will you find out? That makes things worse because
it gives you just
> > that: false sense of security. My apartment door is
very good, steel
> > frame etc., but I'm damn sure burglars if any would
use balcony because
> > it's not very high and has just one simple door
(that's why there's no
> > resaleable valuables at home). Making the door
stronger in my case
> > doesn't pay. But for SourceMage the perspective is
to contain valuable
> > data, so it has to have security which everyone can
rely on.
> >
> > BTW, I think it would hurt to just take the
checksum and apply it to
> > _both_ tar and tar.gz/bz2, and see which one
matches. But for nes
> > spells, the checksum should be generated against tar.
> >
> > --Sergey.
> >
> > Julian v. Bock wrote:
>
> You are paryially correct. While using MD5sums would
possibly enhance the
> feeling of security beyond what it actually entails,
the MD5sums _will_
> give some additional security if the burglars do
decide to come in the
> front door. :)
>
> So, since it provides some additional security
against a frontal assault I
> say that we should use MD5sums (on the .tar, not the
.tar.xxx). As for
> the balcony, we need to find other ways to bolster
those defenses, as
> MD5sums (as you say) will not help keep them out
other ways.
>
> -One of Three
>
> --
> Eric Sandall | Source Mage
GNU/Linux Developer
> sandalle AT hellhound.homeip.net |
http://www.sourcemage.org
> http://hellhound.homeip.net/~sandalle | SystAdmin @
Inst. Shock Physics @
> WSU
> ICQ: 667348 |
http://www.shock.wsu.edu/
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> SM-Discuss mailing list
> SM-Discuss AT lists.ibiblio.org
> http://lists.ibiblio.org/mailman/listinfo/sm-discuss
>
>
Sergey Lipnevich, MCSE, SCPJ,
Sr. Software Engineer,
New Age Network New York, Inc.,
+1-848-459-LIPN.
-
[SM-Discuss] md5 checks / possibly compromised openssh tarball,
Julian v. Bock, 08/01/2002
-
Re: [SM-Discuss] md5 checks / possibly compromised openssh tarball,
Julian v. Bock, 08/01/2002
-
Re: [SM-Discuss] md5 checks / possibly compromised openssh tarball,
Sergey A. Lipnevich, 08/01/2002
- Re: [SM-Discuss] md5 checks / possibly compromised openssh tarball, Eric Sandall, 08/01/2002
-
Re: [SM-Discuss] md5 checks / possibly compromised openssh tarball,
Sergey A. Lipnevich, 08/01/2002
- <Possible follow-up(s)>
- Re: [SM-Discuss] md5 checks / possibly compromised openssh tarball, Sergey A. Lipnevich, 08/01/2002
-
Re: [SM-Discuss] md5 checks / possibly compromised openssh tarball,
Julian v. Bock, 08/01/2002
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