Discussion of all things related to Public Domain

[tom poe <tompoe AT ableweb.net>]

Hello:  Thank you for your response.  Your points are well-taken, and I
am sharing them with others on our mailing list.

My comment in reply to your thorough response is simply, the voter is
the regulator in this instance.  As we have seen with ATM systems, the
custormer is the regulator, and reassurance to the customer that their
bank information is correct, is the most critical audit trail
requirement of such a system.  With voting machines, it is equally
important that the voter be reassured her ballot is correct, and a
printed copy is available in the event of recounts. There's a saying in
the drug product approval system, "It's not what the regulators know
that bothers them, but what they don't know, that concerns them."  With
that in mind, and with the intent of the Help America Vote Act [HAVA]
requirements, that a printout for voter verification be made available
[deadline 2006], it would seem your points fall short of a satisfactory
consideration for why no voter verification is available, today.  Do you
believe your present arguments will dissolve on January 1, 2006, when
all voting machines must, by law, provide voter verification printouts? 
Possibly, I have missed that in my quick reading of your response.  This
is an important question, and if you can help gain some insight, I'd
appreciate it. Having printouts available in the state of Georgia for
the 2002 elections would have assured the voters that the machines
worked as intended, and that the surprising runaway for Republicans for
the first time in history in that state was coincidental to the state's
use of Direct Recording Election [DRE] machines.  For all the auditing
capabilities, the state of Georgia still cannot assure voters the
machines worked as intended, and that's a BIG PROBLEM.
Thanks,
Tom Poe
Open Studios
Reno, NV
http://www.studioforrecording.org/

On Tue, 2003-04-15 at 04:05, Stotesbery, Bill wrote:
> Tom -- Most, if not all, of the current systems, including ours, can produce
> a paper record that can be manually audited. This does not necessarily mean
> that the paper copy of the ballot is to be produced as the voter votes. 
> 
> I understand, of course, the drive for a voter verifiable ballot. However,
> there are several potential consequences that are clearly not intended that
> might occur from adoption of requirements for paper ballots
> 
> The following is a statement we prepared for a meeting in California
> discussing this subject. I have also attached a paper by Michael Shamos of
> Carnegie Mellon that provides some interesting insights related to this
> topic.
> 
> "For example, the additional time required for a voter to examine a paper
> copy of his or her ballot in the voting booth could substantially increase
> lines and waiting, creating the possibility for increased voter
> disenfranchisement. We know the impact of long lines in voting, and
> electronic systems have the potential to decrease this problem since voting
> tends to be faster.  The addition of a mandatory verification step in the
> voting booth would mitigate much of the advantage the electronic system
> offers in this regard. 
> 
> Also important are the potential disruptions that could occur as a result of
> printer malfunctions.  A key advantage of most of the systems being offered
> by the vendors represented here today is that there are few mechanical parts
> to malfunction. Printers are different. They jam, ink or toner has to be
> replaced, and a wide range of other issues can complicate their operation.
> With the approach to paper ballot systems that is generally proposed, this
> places the burden of dealing with these issues squarely on the shoulders of
> already overworked poll workers. Counties are left with the dilemma of
> managing the resulting complexity with existing poll workers, or assuming
> the additional cost of additional poll workers. 
> 
> Finally, it is not outside of the realm of possibility that a voter hoping
> to undermine the integrity of the electoral process could claim that paper
> ballots did not match electronic cast votes, even when such is not case. The
> use of such a tactic becomes another way of challenging an election, even
> when the election was accurate. 
> The comparative benefit of paper ballot systems is also questionable. 
> 
> Advocates contend that paper ballots provide absolute assurance that a valid
> record of the vote exists. However, hand counts are notoriously faulty,
> especially in large quantities. 
> 
> Furthermore, if there is any validity to the conspiracy concerns of the
> paper ballot advocates, surely humans trusted with hand counting votes are
> not immune from temptation.  Electronic systems have very few opportunities
> for human intervention, whereas paper ballot systems have multiple
> opportunities for human intervention.  
> 
> Electronic systems have full audit capabilities to detect intrusion, while
> paper ballot systems do not.  Electronic systems store votes in multiple
> places to assure no tampering in transit and counting.  Paper ballot systems
> do not.   
> 
> Further, any election official will admit that achieving a consistent hand
> count of ballots is almost impossible due to the number of opportunities for
> human induced errors.  In a large jurisdiction, the time to count the
> ballots would extend to days, and the longer it takes to count ballots the
> less likely the voting public is to have confidence in the results.
> 
> There are obvious concerns about cost. Putting a printer in every polling
> place will be expensive, and supplying the printers will eliminate much of
> the financial advantage that eliminating ballot printing and punch card
> printing offers counties. As I mentioned earlier, the cost of operating the
> polling places will increase, since more labor will be required on election
> day, and the cost of warehousing, storage, and maintenance will increase."
> 
> Finally, as part of our development effort, we are working hard to
> continually increase the security of the system, reflecting standards such
> as the NIST Common Criteria and others. 
> 
> Now, I have shared the information you requested. Would you be good enough
> to tell me a bit about yourself and your interest.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Bill Stotesbery
> 
> Electronic voting systems provide security that goes far beyond that of the
> systems they are replacing, and the integrity of the election process will
> be better served with well-designed, properly implemented technology.  To
> assume that electronic systems will create massive voter fraud opportunities
> is to embrace the idea that mischief-makers will have unprecedented
> knowledge, absolute access, and unfettered opportunity to hijack an
> election.
> 
> Therefore, in developing a concept for our approach to this challenge, we
> have attempted to develop a system that meets several objectives:
> *The system should minimize complexity for election judges, poll workers,
> and voters
> *The system should not significantly add to cost of the polling place
> *The system should require a minimum number of new hardware devices at the
> polling place
> *The system should be able to be implemented as an upgrade to existing
> electronic voting systems
> *The system should not require the voter to examine his or her ballot while
> still in the voting booth.
> We are continuing our efforts to develop a system that meets these
> objectives, and we await decisions from election authorities that will
> clarify standards that must be met. However, we remain convinced that
> properly designed and properly deployed paperless systems can provide the
> highest level of accuracy, reliability and confidence.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: tom poe [mailto:tompoe AT ableweb.net]
> Sent: Monday, April 14, 2003 10:43 PM
> To: Stotesbery, Bill
> Cc: Community Studios
> Subject: RE: general question
> 
> 
> Hi:  According to the Connecticutt Attorney General's Office, Jan 30,
> 2003, the federal election reform requirements include:
> "produce a permanent paper record for the voting system that can be
> manually audited and is avaialble as an official record for recounts."
> BUT, that doesn't have to be in place until 2006!
> 
> Assuming the requirement satisfies the need of the voter to be able to
> verify her voting ballot, and placing the paper record in a sealed
> container, then the question becomes one of why isn't that option built
> into all voter machines now?  Why wait?
> 
> As to your alluding to "we remain concerned about potential consequences
> and complications that accompany the voter verifiable paper ballot.", I
> suggest you might want to clarify your concerns as a part of any
> discussion.  I am interested in learning more about the drawbacks of any
> audit trail that does include a paper printout for the voter to verify,
> and for the use in the event a recount is necessary, and many others are
> as well.
> 
> Thank you for your response.
> Tom Poe
> Open Studios
> Reno, NV
> http://www.studioforrecording.org/ 
> 
> On Mon, 2003-04-14 at 20:19, Stotesbery, Bill wrote:
> > We have a product design that supports a voter verifiable paper ballot,
> but
> > have not yet submitted it for certification. We are waiting for the
> > standards and specifications to clarify as the various oversight bodies
> > consider this issue. 
> > 
> > The approach we will implement employs a ballot review station where the
> > voter can examine his or ballot and approve or reject it. 
> > 
> > In developing this solution, however, we remain concerned about potential
> > consequences and complications that accompany the voter verifiable paper
> > ballot. 
> > 
> > Can you provide some more information on your interest?
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: tom poe [mailto:tompoe AT ableweb.net]
> > Sent: Monday, April 14, 2003 8:41 PM
> > To: info AT hartic.com
> > Cc: Community Studios
> > Subject: general question
> > 
> > 
> > Hi:  Does your product provide a printout for the voter?
> > Thanks,
> > Tom Poe
> > Open Studios
> > Reno, NV
> > http://www.studioforrecording.org/
> > 
> > 
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