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Subject: Global-Scale Distributed Storage Systems

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  • From: "Josh" <josh AT mercuryfs.net>
  • To: "Bluesky global storage list \(E-mail\)" <bluesky AT franklin.oit.unc.edu>
  • Subject: uni id loopback weakness
  • Date: Sat, 11 Aug 2001 17:36:49 -0700


Oh, one thing I forgot to point out. I see a basic weakness in that a false
loopback which would act like an authentication server, and take the
information from the validator, and just feed it right back to it, and give
an approval.

I intend to overcome this by using standard methods of authentication of an
IP address, such as digital certificates and something else.

Once way to address this vulnerability is to have the central authentication
service remember something about the last authentication that happened from
that IP address, and use it as a method of proof for the current method. In
theory, a fully automated method ought to correctly pass data forever, and
only a failure or hack attempt would cause a disruption in this endless loop
(or should I say chain). But this would be separate from the user's ID,
rather it would be an issue between the validator and universal-id.net, to
help insure the authenticity of the validator.

A home PC and a public use PC such as in an airport have different security
requirements in this respect. There is much more to be added to UNI ID,
maybe plugging it into PGP. There is no reason why RSA must be used in MFS.




  • uni id loopback weakness, Josh, 08/11/2001

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