Biblical Hebrew Forum

[Jerry Shepherd <jshepherd53 AT gmail.com>]

Hi Karl,

 

Some responses to your last couple of posts"

 

Karl: What I react against is the notion that as a general rule, words from the same background can have multiple meanings, often unrelated to each other. While that can be true on a longitudinal study where words change meaning, that is rare at any one point in time.

 

Jerry: But Karl, this is simply a very well recognized phenomenon.  Words do have multiple meanings that are often unrelated to each other, as far as their usage is concerned.  They may, and usually are, related to each other, but they don't have the same meaning.  And it is not rare at any one point in time; rather, it is very common at any one point in time.

 

Karl: If this is rare in modern languages, why should Biblical Hebrew be treated differently? I object to the cavalier attitude that because a few words in modern languages may have varying meanings, therefore we willy nilly can give Biblical Hebrew words whatever meanings we want to fit our readings of Tanakh. That is sloppy lexicography at best, and if carried to its logical conclusion, makes any and all terms undefined.

 

Jerry: Again, it is not rare in modern languages, and Biblical Hebrew shouldn't be treated differently.  And the scholars do not "willy nilly" assign meanings they want; rather, they carefully examine the different and based on their knowledge of the words, the uses in cognate, the context being examined, and any number of other factors, determine what seems to be the best definition in context.  This is not sloppy lexicography; on the contrary, the lexicographers do their work diligently.   As far as your concern that this makes "any and all terms undefined," this simply is not the case, as any perusal of the standard lexicons makes abundantly clear.

 

Karl: Even in “strike”, where it’s used in a seemingly opposite manner, is used in a highly specialized manner still referring back to the common action.

 

Jerry: Keep in mind that no one, as far as I can tell, is trying to argue that "strike," as commonly used in baseball, is unrelated to "strike," meaning "hit."  That isn't the issue.  The issue is that is complete nonsense to argue that, in some way, "strike" used to refer to a miss, and "strike" used to refer to a hit, still in some way constitute a "one unique meaning."  That position is indefensible.

 

Karl: Are you trying to say that because words can be use idiomatically, therefore Biblical Hebrew terms are in practice undefined and undefinable? That we can assign whatever meaning that we want to make any particular passage give the reading that we want it to have? I appears to me that this is what you are trying to argue for.

 

Jerry: This reductionism does not work.  This is not at all what I am arguing, or, as far as I can tell, anyone else involved in this discussion.

 

Karl: How can I make it more clear, that I use a different methodology than Gesenius, BDB, HALOT and others, a methodology that looks at action and function where they look at form? And when looking at action, I see a unity of action where they see differences of form?

 

Jerry: First of all, I think you have very convoluted ideas about the difference of form and function.  In fact, it seems to me that you have it completely backwards.  You are the one fixated on a form, or an ur-function, where the lexicons are examining function in each context.

 

Karl: This is the reason I wrote my dictionary.

 

Jerry: And who uses this dictionary?

 

Karl: . . . rarely do words refer to more than one function.

 

Jerry: It's really quite common.

 

Karl: I have trouble understanding why you all don’t recognize what I say.

 

Jerry: Probably because they are too well-trained in linguistics, and aren't committed to a defending a position which is indefensible.

 

Karl: I have no idea what you’re talking about with this example, as I have not read an English translation of the Bible in decades.

 

Jerry: And this is to your credit?

 

To make sure this relates to Hebrew, take for example the word יכח.  Perhaps in the majority of cases, it means something along the lines of "rebuke," "reproach," etc.  But it can also mean to "argue a case," "to be vindicated,"  or "to arbitrate."  It is very doubtful that the range in meaning is to be accounted for by postulating different roots.  What we have with this word is a range of meanings, all probably related to some kind of original forensic or condemnatory context, but developing into very different and practically opposite meanings.  To rebuke someone is exactly the opposite of either vindicating them or arbitrating on their behalf.

 

Looking forward to more discussion.

 

Blessings,

 

Jerry

  

Jerry Shepherd

Taylor Seminary

Edmonton, Alberta

jshepherd53 AT gmail.com

 

On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 4:20 PM, K Randolph <kwrandolph AT gmail.com> wrote:

Jerry:

What I react against is the notion that as a general rule, words from the same background can have multiple meanings, often unrelated to each other. While that can be true on a longitudinal study where words change meaning, that is rare at any one point in time.

Further, I distinguish between words from the same etymology, and those from different etymologies that have become homonyms. (In Biblical Hebrew, I would not be surprised if, of the Biblical Hebrew homographs, most had different pronunciations.)

If this is rare in modern languages, why should Biblical Hebrew be treated differently? I object to the cavalier attitude that because a few words in modern languages may have varying meanings, therefore we willy nilly can give Biblical Hebrew words whatever meanings we want to fit our readings of Tanakh. That is sloppy lexicography at best, and if carried to its logical conclusion, makes any and all terms undefined.

On Sun, May 5, 2013 at 10:45 PM, Jerry Shepherd <jshepherd53 AT gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Karl,

 

And your suggestion that only "0.1 percent of total vocabulary" constitues the number of exceptions seems to me be an incredibly low estimate.  Indeed, the very phenomenon that a language can have literally thousand and thousands of puns belies this suggestion.

I can’t speak for your experience, but mine is that the majority of puns deal not only with words from different etymologies, but their pronunciations also differ. The pronunciations are close, so the connection can be made, but in the majority of the puns, the pronunciations differ. So I don’t see puns as evidence for your claims.

 

  Furthermore, it is the most common words in a language that can have the widest range of meanings, and are prime candidates for having completely opposite meanings.  Indeed, notice how the examples Ruth used were very common words: draw, strike, class.

Yet if you look at the actions behind the words, all three of your examples, you find a commonality of action. Even in “strike”, where it’s used in a seemingly opposite manner, is used in a highly specialized manner still referring back to the common action.

Therefore, how does the use of these examples justify giving meanings to Biblical Hebrew terms that have no relationship to each other, no commonality of action?

 

  You simply argue for way too much when you argue that lexemes "generally have one meaning at any one point in time."  This can only be argued by a rather severe distortion of the word "meaning."

 

Even in your reply you used a word that demonstrates the tenuousness of your thesis.  That was the word "word."  Your use of the word "word" was very different than the usage in the common phrase, "I'd like to have word with you."  As opposed to a single word, the last usage refers to an entire conversation.  The "Word of God" refers not to a single word, but to an entire collection of books.  In "he preached the word." "word" refers to a sermon.  Are these usages related?  Most certainly.  Do they have the same meaning?  Not at all.

Are you trying to say that because words can be use idiomatically, therefore Biblical Hebrew terms are in practice undefined and undefinable? That we can assign whatever meaning that we want to make any particular passage give the reading that we want it to have? I appears to me that this is what you are trying to argue for.

 

  And none of these meanings are unique, as easily demonstrated by the fact that other words in the language can be subsituted for them and the same meaning can still be derived.

Since when does the fact that each word has a unique meaning preclude it from having synonyms? “to see”, “to stare”, “to look” etc. all can be substituted for each other, but each has a unique shading that makes one a better fit for a certain context than another. And haven’t you noticed that some terms can be used in a greater range of contexts than other?

 

  So, I simply can't see how your thesis that words generally have only one meaning and are also unique at any one point in time either corresponds to reality or has any real value in linguistic discussion.  This is true for English, and it's also true for Biblical Hebrew (note the very wide range of meanings for the commonest Hebrew words).

This is why I go back to the action symbolized by a term, rather than to how it appears in form of each use. Haven’t you noticed this? Function over form. This is why I disagree with defining according to semantic fields. That’s how I learn modern languages, as well as ancient ones.

 

Blessings,

 

Jerry

Jerry Shepherd

Taylor Seminary

Edmonton, Alberta

jshepherd53 AT gmail.com

 

Karl W. Randolph.