Source Mage code commit list

[Pavel Vinogradov <scm AT sourcemage.org>]

GIT changes to master grimoire by Pavel Vinogradov <public AT sourcemage.org>:

 libs/glibc/DETAILS                     |    4 
 libs/glibc/HISTORY                     |    4 
 libs/glibc/patches/CVE-2023-4911.patch |  172 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

New commits:
commit 38056510a14e8c415a6c3d1babb2651a61641d7b
Author: Pavel Vinogradov <public AT sourcemage.org>
Commit: Pavel Vinogradov <public AT sourcemage.org>

    libs/glibc: SECURITY_PATCH (CVE-2023-4911)

diff --git a/libs/glibc/DETAILS b/libs/glibc/DETAILS
index 4521cbc..97e9401 100755
--- a/libs/glibc/DETAILS
+++ b/libs/glibc/DETAILS
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ SOURCE_DIRECTORY=$BUILD_DIRECTORY/$SPELL-git
    SOURCE_IGNORE=volatile
   else
          VERSION=2.38
-  SECURITY_PATCH=20
+  SECURITY_PATCH=21
           SOURCE=$SPELL-$VERSION.tar.xz
 SOURCE_DIRECTORY=$BUILD_DIRECTORY/$SPELL-$VERSION
          SOURCE2=$SOURCE.sig
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ SOURCE_DIRECTORY=$BUILD_DIRECTORY/$SPELL-$VERSION
   SOURCE2_IGNORE=signature
   fi
   if [[ $GLIBC_SANITIZE_HEADERS == n ]]; then
- HEADERS_VERSION=6.4.7
+ HEADERS_VERSION=6.5.5
  HEADERS_MAJOR_VERSION=$(echo $HEADERS_VERSION|cut -f1 -d.)
          SOURCE3=linux-${HEADERS_VERSION}.tar.xz
          SOURCE6=linux-${HEADERS_VERSION}.tar.sign
diff --git a/libs/glibc/HISTORY b/libs/glibc/HISTORY
index 411c8cc..c360b61 100644
--- a/libs/glibc/HISTORY
+++ b/libs/glibc/HISTORY
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+2023-10-03 Pavel Vinogradov <public AT sorcemage.org>
+       * DETAILS, patches/CVE-2023-4911.patch: SECURITY_PATCH++, 
(CVE-2023-4911),
+         HEADERS_VERSION=6.5.5
+
 2023-08-01 Pavel Vinogradov <public AT sourcemage.org>
        * DETAILS: version 2.38, SECURITY_PATCH++, (CVE-2023-25139),
          HEADERS_VERSION=6.4.7, corrected Watch line
diff --git a/libs/glibc/patches/CVE-2023-4911.patch 
b/libs/glibc/patches/CVE-2023-4911.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7250847
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libs/glibc/patches/CVE-2023-4911.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+From 1056e5b4c3f2d90ed2b4a55f96add28da2f4c8fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh AT sourceware.org>
+Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2023 18:39:32 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] tunables: Terminate if end of input is reached
+ (CVE-2023-4911)
+
+The string parsing routine may end up writing beyond bounds of tunestr
+if the input tunable string is malformed, of the form name=name=val.
+This gets processed twice, first as name=name=val and next as name=val,
+resulting in tunestr being name=name=val:name=val, thus overflowing
+tunestr.
+
+Terminate the parsing loop at the first instance itself so that tunestr
+does not overflow.
+
+This also fixes up tst-env-setuid-tunables to actually handle failures
+correct and add new tests to validate the fix for this CVE.
+
+Signed-off-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh AT sourceware.org>
+Reviewed-by: Carlos O'Donell <carlos AT redhat.com>
+---
+ NEWS                          |  5 +++++
+ elf/dl-tunables.c             | 17 +++++++++-------
+ elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
+index a94650da64..cc4b81f0ac 100644
+--- a/NEWS
++++ b/NEWS
+@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ Security related changes:
+   an application calls getaddrinfo for AF_INET6 with AI_CANONNAME,
+   AI_ALL and AI_V4MAPPED flags set.
+ 
++  CVE-2023-4911: If a tunable of the form NAME=NAME=VAL is passed in the
++  environment of a setuid program and NAME is valid, it may result in a
++  buffer overflow, which could be exploited to achieve escalated
++  privileges.  This flaw was introduced in glibc 2.34.
++
+ The following bugs are resolved with this release:
+ 
+   [The release manager will add the list generated by
+diff --git a/elf/dl-tunables.c b/elf/dl-tunables.c
+index 62b7332d95..cae67efa0a 100644
+--- a/elf/dl-tunables.c
++++ b/elf/dl-tunables.c
+@@ -180,11 +180,7 @@ parse_tunables (char *tunestr, char *valstring)
+       /* If we reach the end of the string before getting a valid name-value
+        pair, bail out.  */
+       if (p[len] == '\0')
+-      {
+-        if (__libc_enable_secure)
+-          tunestr[off] = '\0';
+-        return;
+-      }
++      break;
+ 
+       /* We did not find a valid name-value pair before encountering the
+        colon.  */
+@@ -244,9 +240,16 @@ parse_tunables (char *tunestr, char *valstring)
+           }
+       }
+ 
+-      if (p[len] != '\0')
+-      p += len + 1;
++      /* We reached the end while processing the tunable string.  */
++      if (p[len] == '\0')
++      break;
++
++      p += len + 1;
+     }
++
++  /* Terminate tunestr before we leave.  */
++  if (__libc_enable_secure)
++    tunestr[off] = '\0';
+ }
+ 
+ /* Enable the glibc.malloc.check tunable in SETUID/SETGID programs only when
+diff --git a/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c b/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c
+index 7dfb0e073a..f0b92c97e7 100644
+--- a/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c
++++ b/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ const char *teststrings[] =
+   
"glibc.malloc.perturb=0x800:not_valid.malloc.check=2:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+   "glibc.not_valid.check=2:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+   "not_valid.malloc.check=2:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
++  "glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
++  "glibc.malloc.check=2",
+   
"glibc.malloc.garbage=2:glibc.maoc.mmap_threshold=4096:glibc.malloc.check=2",
+   
"glibc.malloc.check=4:glibc.malloc.garbage=2:glibc.maoc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+   ":glibc.malloc.garbage=2:glibc.malloc.check=1",
+@@ -68,6 +70,8 @@ const char *resultstrings[] =
+   "glibc.malloc.perturb=0x800:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+   "glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+   "glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
++  "glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
++  "",
+   "",
+   "",
+   "",
+@@ -81,11 +85,18 @@ test_child (int off)
+ {
+   const char *val = getenv ("GLIBC_TUNABLES");
+ 
++  printf ("    [%d] GLIBC_TUNABLES is %s\n", off, val);
++  fflush (stdout);
+   if (val != NULL && strcmp (val, resultstrings[off]) == 0)
+     return 0;
+ 
+   if (val != NULL)
+-    printf ("[%d] Unexpected GLIBC_TUNABLES VALUE %s\n", off, val);
++    printf ("    [%d] Unexpected GLIBC_TUNABLES VALUE %s, expected %s\n",
++          off, val, resultstrings[off]);
++  else
++    printf ("    [%d] GLIBC_TUNABLES environment variable absent\n", off);
++
++  fflush (stdout);
+ 
+   return 1;
+ }
+@@ -106,21 +117,26 @@ do_test (int argc, char **argv)
+       if (ret != 0)
+       exit (1);
+ 
+-      exit (EXIT_SUCCESS);
++      /* Special return code to make sure that the child executed all the 
way
++       through.  */
++      exit (42);
+     }
+   else
+     {
+-      int ret = 0;
+-
+       /* Spawn tests.  */
+       for (int i = 0; i < array_length (teststrings); i++)
+       {
+         char buf[INT_BUFSIZE_BOUND (int)];
+ 
+-        printf ("Spawned test for %s (%d)\n", teststrings[i], i);
++        printf ("[%d] Spawned test for %s\n", i, teststrings[i]);
+         snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "%d\n", i);
++        fflush (stdout);
+         if (setenv ("GLIBC_TUNABLES", teststrings[i], 1) != 0)
+-          exit (1);
++          {
++            printf ("    [%d] Failed to set GLIBC_TUNABLES: %m", i);
++            support_record_failure ();
++            continue;
++          }
+ 
+         int status = support_capture_subprogram_self_sgid (buf);
+ 
+@@ -128,9 +144,14 @@ do_test (int argc, char **argv)
+         if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == EXIT_UNSUPPORTED)
+           return EXIT_UNSUPPORTED;
+ 
+-        ret |= status;
++        if (WEXITSTATUS (status) != 42)
++          {
++            printf ("    [%d] child failed with status %d\n", i,
++                    WEXITSTATUS (status));
++            support_record_failure ();
++          }
+       }
+-      return ret;
++      return 0;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.39.3
+