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sm-commit - [SM-Commit] GIT changes to master grimoire by Pavel Vinogradov (5b4d461cd1c0c0fa3b7bd65f07b347ffdf22c09d)

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  • From: Pavel Vinogradov <scm AT sourcemage.org>
  • To: sm-commit AT lists.ibiblio.org
  • Subject: [SM-Commit] GIT changes to master grimoire by Pavel Vinogradov (5b4d461cd1c0c0fa3b7bd65f07b347ffdf22c09d)
  • Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 03:35:21 +0000

GIT changes to master grimoire by Pavel Vinogradov <public AT sourcemage.org>:

crypto/openssh/DETAILS | 2
crypto/openssh/HISTORY | 4
crypto/openssh/PRE_BUILD | 1
crypto/openssh/scp-name-validator.patch | 348
--------------------------------
4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 350 deletions(-)

New commits:
commit 5b4d461cd1c0c0fa3b7bd65f07b347ffdf22c09d
Author: Pavel Vinogradov <public AT sourcemage.org>
Commit: Pavel Vinogradov <public AT sourcemage.org>

crypto/openssh: version 8.0p1

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/DETAILS b/crypto/openssh/DETAILS
index 1de1ebc..957f7d8 100755
--- a/crypto/openssh/DETAILS
+++ b/crypto/openssh/DETAILS
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
SPELL=openssh
- VERSION=7.9p1
+ VERSION=8.0p1
SECURITY_PATCH=13
PATCHLEVEL=1
SOURCE=$SPELL-$VERSION.tar.gz
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/HISTORY b/crypto/openssh/HISTORY
index 1ce8921..ef7443e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/HISTORY
+++ b/crypto/openssh/HISTORY
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+2019-04-17 Pavel Vinogradov <public AT sourcemage.org>
+ * DETAILS: version 8.0p1
+ * PRE_BUILD, scp-name-validator.patch: removed the patch
+
2019-01-22 Treeve Jelbert <treeve AT sourcemage.org>
* DEPENDS: add libedit

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PRE_BUILD b/crypto/openssh/PRE_BUILD
index 6cd6d39..f8ff8f4 100755
--- a/crypto/openssh/PRE_BUILD
+++ b/crypto/openssh/PRE_BUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
default_pre_build &&

cd "$SOURCE_DIRECTORY" &&
-patch -Np1 < "$SCRIPT_DIRECTORY/scp-name-validator.patch" &&

if [ "${OPENSSH_LPK}" == "y" ]; then
cd "${SOURCE_DIRECTORY}" &&
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp-name-validator.patch
b/crypto/openssh/scp-name-validator.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2223de3..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/scp-name-validator.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,348 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/defines.h b/defines.h
-index 8f421306..8b4af9b2 100644
---- a/defines.h
-+++ b/defines.h
-@@ -873,4 +873,10 @@ struct winsize {
- # define USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
- #endif
-
-+/*
-+ * Define to enable additional scp file name validation against
-+ * malicious servers.
-+ */
-+#define USE_SCP_NAME_VALIDATOR 1
-+
- #endif /* _DEFINES_H */
-diff --git a/progressmeter.c b/progressmeter.c
-index fe9bf52e..b2a3a38d 100644
---- a/progressmeter.c
-+++ b/progressmeter.c
-@@ -160,7 +160,10 @@ refresh_progress_meter(void)
- buf[0] = '\0';
- file_len = win_size - 35;
- if (file_len > 0) {
-- len = snprintf(buf, file_len + 1, "\r%s", file);
-+ char visbuf[MAX_WINSIZE + 1];
-+ (void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf),
-+ NULL, "%s", file);
-+ len = snprintf(buf, file_len + 1, "\r%s", visbuf);
- if (len < 0)
- len = 0;
- if (len >= file_len + 1)
-diff --git a/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
-index 59f1ff63..dd48a482 100644
---- a/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
-+++ b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
-@@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ badserver_4)
- echo "C755 2 file"
- echo "X"
- ;;
-+badserver_5)
-+ echo "D0555 0 "
-+ echo "X"
-+ ;;
-+badserver_6)
-+ echo "D0555 0 ."
-+ echo "X"
-+ ;;
-+badserver_7)
-+ echo "C0755 2 extrafile"
-+ echo "X"
-+ ;;
- *)
- set -- $arg
- shift
-diff --git a/regress/scp.sh b/regress/scp.sh
-index 57cc7706..104c89e1 100644
---- a/regress/scp.sh
-+++ b/regress/scp.sh
-@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
- scpclean() {
- rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2}
- mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2}
-+ chmod 755 ${DIR} ${DIR2}
- }
-
- verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to local file"
-@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ]; then
- $SUDO rm ${DIR2}/copy
- fi
-
--for i in 0 1 2 3 4; do
-+for i in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7; do
- verbose "$tid: disallow bad server #$i"
- SCPTESTMODE=badserver_$i
- export DIR SCPTESTMODE
-@@ -113,6 +114,15 @@ for i in 0 1 2 3 4; do
- scpclean
- $SCP -r $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
- [ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation outside of
subdir"
-+
-+ scpclean
-+ $SCP -pr $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
-+ [ ! -w ${DIR2} ] && fail "allows target root attribute change"
-+
-+ scpclean
-+ $SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
-+ [ -e ${DIR2}/extrafile ] && fail "allows extranous object creation"
-+ rm -f ${DIR2}/extrafile
- done
-
- verbose "$tid: detect non-directory target"
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index eb17c341..da1a3a44 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
- /*
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Harry Sintonen. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -87,6 +88,14 @@
- #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
- # include <sys/time.h>
- #endif
-+#ifdef USE_SCP_NAME_VALIDATOR
-+# include <libgen.h>
-+# ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
-+# include <glob.h>
-+# else
-+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
-+# endif
-+#endif
- #include <sys/wait.h>
- #include <sys/uio.h>
-
-@@ -277,6 +286,18 @@ do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd,
int *fdin, int *fdout)
- close(pout[0]);
- dup2(pin[0], 0);
- dup2(pout[1], 1);
-+ /*
-+ * If we're not expecting output to stderr, redirect it to
void.
-+ * This helps avoiding output manipulation attacks by
malicious
-+ * servers.
-+ */
-+ if (!verbose_mode) {
-+ int fd = open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY);
-+ if (fd != -1) {
-+ dup2(fd, 2);
-+ close(fd);
-+ }
-+ }
- close(pin[0]);
- close(pout[1]);
-
-@@ -380,9 +401,20 @@ int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive,
targetshouldbedirectory;
- #define CMDNEEDS 64
- char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
-
-+#ifdef USE_SCP_NAME_VALIDATOR
-+typedef struct {
-+ const char *pattern;
-+ int depth;
-+} SINKDATA;
-+#endif
-+
- int response(void);
- void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
-+#ifdef USE_SCP_NAME_VALIDATOR
-+void sink(int, char *[], SINKDATA *);
-+#else
- void sink(int, char *[]);
-+#endif
- void source(int, char *[]);
- void tolocal(int, char *[]);
- void toremote(int, char *[]);
-@@ -536,7 +568,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- }
- if (tflag) {
- /* Receive data. */
-+#ifdef USE_SCP_NAME_VALIDATOR
-+ sink(argc, argv, NULL);
-+#else
- sink(argc, argv);
-+#endif
- exit(errs != 0);
- }
- if (argc < 2)
-@@ -750,6 +786,9 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
- char *bp, *host = NULL, *src = NULL, *suser = NULL;
- arglist alist;
- int i, r, sport = -1;
-+#ifdef USE_SCP_NAME_VALIDATOR
-+ SINKDATA sinkdata;
-+#endif
-
- memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
- alist.list = NULL;
-@@ -793,7 +832,13 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
- continue;
- }
- free(bp);
-+#ifdef USE_SCP_NAME_VALIDATOR
-+ sinkdata.pattern = basename(xstrdup(src));
-+ sinkdata.depth = 0;
-+ sink(1, argv + argc - 1, &sinkdata);
-+#else
- sink(1, argv + argc - 1);
-+#endif
- (void) close(remin);
- remin = remout = -1;
- }
-@@ -968,8 +1013,71 @@ rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
- (sizeof(type) == 8 && (val) > INT64_MAX) || \
- (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8))
-
-+#ifdef USE_SCP_NAME_VALIDATOR
-+#ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
-+struct fakedir {
-+ struct dirent de;
-+#ifdef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
-+ char denamebuf[256];
-+#endif
-+ struct dirent tmpde;
-+#ifdef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
-+ char tmpdenamebuf[2]; /* only needs to hold "." or ".." */
-+#endif
-+ int dirindex;
-+};
-+static struct fakedir fakedir;
-+static void
-+g_closedir(void *ptr)
-+{
-+}
-+static struct dirent *
-+g_readdir(void *ptr)
-+{
-+ struct fakedir *fd = ptr;
-+ switch (fd->dirindex) {
-+ case 1:
-+ case 2:
-+ strcpy(fd->tmpde.d_name, fd->dirindex == 1 ? "." :
"..");
-+ fd->tmpde.d_type = DT_DIR;
-+ fd->tmpde.d_ino = fd->dirindex++;
-+ return &fd->tmpde;
-+ case 3:
-+ fd->de.d_ino = fd->dirindex++;
-+ return &fd->de;
-+ }
-+ return NULL;
-+}
-+static void *
-+g_opendir(const char *name)
-+{
-+ if (strcmp(name, ".") != 0) {
-+ errno = ENOENT;
-+ return NULL;
-+ }
-+ fakedir.dirindex = 1;
-+ return &fakedir;
-+}
-+static int
-+g_stat(const char *name, struct stat *st)
-+{
-+ if (strcmp(name, fakedir.de.d_name) != 0) {
-+ errno = ENOENT;
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
-+ st->st_mode = fakedir.de.d_type == DT_DIR ? S_IFDIR : S_IFREG;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+#endif
-+#endif
-+
- void
-+#ifdef USE_SCP_NAME_VALIDATOR
-+sink(int argc, char **argv, SINKDATA *sinkdata)
-+#else
- sink(int argc, char **argv)
-+#endif
- {
- static BUF buffer;
- struct stat stb;
-@@ -1113,6 +1221,65 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
- run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
- exit(1);
- }
-+
-+#ifdef USE_SCP_NAME_VALIDATOR
-+ if (sinkdata) {
-+ /*
-+ * Validate the item name returned by the server for
-+ * attempts to modify the current directory
attributes.
-+ *
-+ * Only allow it on root level and only if it was
-+ * explicitly requested by using "host:" or
"dirname/."
-+ */
-+ if (strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 &&
-+ (sinkdata->depth != 0 ||
strcmp(sinkdata->pattern, ".") != 0)) {
-+ run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
-+ exit(1);
-+ }
-+ }
-+#ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
-+ /* Use glob(3) function to validate the item name against
-+ * the last path element (stored in sinkdata->pattern).
-+ *
-+ * We verify that the items returned at the target
-+ * directory level (depth 0) match this pattern.
-+ *
-+ * While a limited check, it will prevent some of the
-+ * potential attacks by a malicious server.
-+ */
-+ if (sinkdata && sinkdata->depth == 0) {
-+ glob_t gl;
-+ int rc;
-+#ifdef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
-+ if (strlen(cp) >= 256) {
-+#else
-+ if (strlen(cp) >= sizeof(fakedir.de.d_name)) {
-+#endif
-+ run_err("error: excessively long filename:
%s", cp);
-+ exit(1);
-+ }
-+ fakedir.de.d_type = buf[0] == 'D' ? DT_DIR : DT_REG;
-+ strcpy(fakedir.de.d_name, cp);
-+
-+ memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl));
-+ gl.gl_closedir = g_closedir;
-+ gl.gl_readdir = g_readdir;
-+ gl.gl_opendir = g_opendir;
-+ gl.gl_lstat = g_stat;
-+ gl.gl_stat = g_stat;
-+
-+ rc = glob(sinkdata->pattern,
GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC|GLOB_NOSORT, NULL, &gl);
-+ globfree(&gl);
-+ if (rc != 0) {
-+ if (rc == GLOB_NOMATCH)
-+ run_err("error: unexpected filename:
%s", cp);
-+ else
-+ run_err("error: glob error %d", rc);
-+ exit(1);
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+#endif
- if (targisdir) {
- static char *namebuf;
- static size_t cursize;
-@@ -1150,7 +1317,15 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
- goto bad;
- }
- vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
-+#ifdef USE_SCP_NAME_VALIDATOR
-+ if (sinkdata)
-+ sinkdata->depth++;
-+ sink(1, vect, sinkdata);
-+ if (sinkdata)
-+ sinkdata->depth--;
-+#else
- sink(1, vect);
-+#endif
- if (setimes) {
- setimes = 0;
- if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)



  • [SM-Commit] GIT changes to master grimoire by Pavel Vinogradov (5b4d461cd1c0c0fa3b7bd65f07b347ffdf22c09d), Pavel Vinogradov, 04/17/2019

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