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Subject: Source Mage code commit list
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[SM-Commit] GIT changes to master grimoire by Ladislav Hagara (afa79f9b7f8c284444aa1dbde1eb1afff2b113d4)
- From: Ladislav Hagara <scm AT sourcemage.org>
- To: sm-commit AT lists.ibiblio.org
- Subject: [SM-Commit] GIT changes to master grimoire by Ladislav Hagara (afa79f9b7f8c284444aa1dbde1eb1afff2b113d4)
- Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2007 06:20:45 -0500
GIT changes to master grimoire by Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>:
crypto/gpgme/DETAILS | 4
crypto/gpgme/HISTORY | 3
crypto/krb5/BUILD | 4
crypto/krb5/DETAILS | 4
crypto/krb5/HISTORY | 4
crypto/krb5/MITKRB5-SA-2007-004.txt | 257
------------------------------------
crypto/krb5/MITKRB5-SA-2007-005.txt | 229 --------------------------------
crypto/nss/DETAILS | 6
crypto/nss/HISTORY | 3
crypto/openct/DETAILS | 4
crypto/openct/HISTORY | 3
crypto/opensc/DETAILS | 4
crypto/opensc/HISTORY | 3
libs/nspr/DETAILS | 4
libs/nspr/HISTORY | 3
utils/multitail/DETAILS | 4
utils/multitail/HISTORY | 3
17 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 505 deletions(-)
New commits:
commit afa79f9b7f8c284444aa1dbde1eb1afff2b113d4
Author: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
Commit: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
nspr 4.6.7
commit 4494db74f29116e68584ed434e8ffacf01e58117
Author: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
Commit: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
nss 3.11.7
commit e5efb956d604dd51a0e13b21dc6aa215b823a532
Author: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
Commit: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
multitail 5.2.0
commit 3d47399a0e39d437fe5c18c4d9ce2d9bcf6660a2
Author: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
Commit: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
krb5 1.6.2
commit 3dfe462f1653f35f3d5e8e6c0811c6d9c9de78cf
Author: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
Commit: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
gpgme 1.1.5
commit 64bfd3c458eed42a22d2121b5e76f21239437107
Author: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
Commit: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
opensc 0.11.3
commit 980f7c9b6f7459a149a003393ff7b8f5e05f729c
Author: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
Commit: Ladislav Hagara <ladislav.hagara AT unob.cz>
openct 0.6.12
diff --git a/crypto/gpgme/DETAILS b/crypto/gpgme/DETAILS
index 95a7bb7..ac9491f 100755
--- a/crypto/gpgme/DETAILS
+++ b/crypto/gpgme/DETAILS
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ case $GPGME_BRANCH in
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:1239388cd5d1286aca7c1d1ebe1508263571b40988c4138e9eabe8b23e6310983cedbfde209e2968330671dc687610114115b5a5d6e44d04c9617ab3207504fa
;;
1.1)
- VERSION=1.1.4
-
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:ec13d848fe748ad64a7b2829d8917386cb120e2e0e05ccf93fbadbf0af8673a28cf748a390ae96db07a75c4ddf5e1ea067339f84a5049d52694261dcf712c361
+ VERSION=1.1.5
+
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:2c1b01246955592cdbcb42f75048a8f1a68142b4b8522a691519501fa93812fbc5eaf8d9056e304df0eb43a8a79dec9087708613dcc175d0ca794c2788aa6dec
;;
esac
diff --git a/crypto/gpgme/HISTORY b/crypto/gpgme/HISTORY
index 47f5cab..9faf8e1 100644
--- a/crypto/gpgme/HISTORY
+++ b/crypto/gpgme/HISTORY
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+2007-07-17 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
+ * DETAILS: 1.1.5
+
2007-03-06 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
* DETAILS: 1.1.4, SECURITY_PATCH=1
http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2007q1/000251.html
diff --git a/crypto/krb5/BUILD b/crypto/krb5/BUILD
index 3730757..14d1206 100755
--- a/crypto/krb5/BUILD
+++ b/crypto/krb5/BUILD
@@ -6,10 +6,6 @@ fi
cd $SPELL-$VERSION/src &&
-# Kerberos Security Advisories
-patch -p1 < $SCRIPT_DIRECTORY/MITKRB5-SA-2007-004.txt &&
-patch -p1 < $SCRIPT_DIRECTORY/MITKRB5-SA-2007-005.txt &&
-
./configure --enable-dns-for-kdc \
--enable-dns-for-realm \
--infodir=/usr/share/info \
diff --git a/crypto/krb5/DETAILS b/crypto/krb5/DETAILS
index e8c04db..9a3ed44 100755
--- a/crypto/krb5/DETAILS
+++ b/crypto/krb5/DETAILS
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
SPELL=krb5
- VERSION=1.6.1
+ VERSION=1.6.2
SOURCE=$SPELL-$VERSION-signed.tar
SOURCE_RAW=$SPELL-$VERSION.tar.gz
SOURCE_DIRECTORY=$BUILD_DIRECTORY/$SPELL-$VERSION
SOURCE_URL[0]=http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/dist/krb5/1.6/$SOURCE
-
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:6f6193eab28a9df487e912ebaa0a43453a01a66cf4c3cae4a2743ee27d89c6aad8add42735bc81123b10518c5723c0bc403ea35498a1371e2a6d680108855992
+
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:d9ebb5fd4300e3a56f5852f29db43eae7ebdf16d5b62406730309a05ca16f27b395dd2542288c5a6508aecf1016634dfce781e514b47f75fb445ece8479fe88d
WEB_SITE=http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/
ENTERED=20020215
LICENSE[0]=http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/krb5-1.6/krb5-1.6/doc/krb5-install.html#Copyright
diff --git a/crypto/krb5/HISTORY b/crypto/krb5/HISTORY
index 00832c3..d445d3d 100644
--- a/crypto/krb5/HISTORY
+++ b/crypto/krb5/HISTORY
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+2007-07-17 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
+ * DETAILS: 1.6.2
+ * BUILD, MITKRB5-SA-2007-00[45].txt: removed patches
+
2007-07-03 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
* DETAILS: SECURITY_PATCH=4
* BUILD, MITKRB5-SA-2007-00[45].txt: added security patches
diff --git a/crypto/krb5/MITKRB5-SA-2007-004.txt
b/crypto/krb5/MITKRB5-SA-2007-004.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 33051b7..0000000
--- a/crypto/krb5/MITKRB5-SA-2007-004.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
------BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
-Hash: SHA1
-
- MIT krb5 Security Advisory 2007-004
-
-Original release: 2007-06-26
-Last update: 2007-06-26
-
-Topic: kadmind affected by multiple RPC library vulnerabilities
-
-Severity: CRITICAL
-
-CVE: CVE-2007-2442
-CERT: VU#356961
-
-CVE: CVE-2007-2443
-CERT: VU#365313
-
-SUMMARY
-=======
-
-The MIT krb5 Kerberos administration daemon (kadmind) is affected by
-multiple vulnerabilities in the RPC library shipped with MIT krb5.
-
-CVE-2007-2442/VU#356961: The RPC library can free an uninitialized
-pointer. This may lead to execution of arbitrary code.
-
-CVE-2007-2443/VU#365313: The RPC library can write past the end of a
-stack buffer. This may (but is unlikely to) lead to execution of
-arbitrary code.
-
-Third-party applications using the RPC library provided with MIT krb5
-may also be vulnerable. Other RPC libraries derived from SunRPC may
-be vulnerable to CVE-2007-2443.
-
-Exploitation of these vulnerabilities is believed to be difficult.
-(See DETAILS.) Proof-of-concept exploits which do not cause execution
-of unintended code exist but are not known to be publicly circulated.
-
-This is a bug in the RPC library included with MIT krb5, which is used
-by kadmind and by some third-party applications. It is not a bug in
-the Kerberos protocol.
-
-IMPACT
-======
-
-An unauthenticated remote user may be able to cause a host running
-kadmind to execute arbitrary code. CVE-2007-2442 is more likely to
-lead to arbitrary code execution than CVE-2007-2443.
-
-Successful exploitation can compromise the Kerberos key database and
-host security on the host running these programs. (kadmind typically
-runs as root.) Unsuccessful exploitation attempts will likely result
-in the affected program crashing.
-
-Third-party applications calling the RPC library provided with MIT
-krb5 may be vulnerable. Other RPC libraries derived from SunRPC may
-be vulnerable.
-
-AFFECTED SOFTWARE
-=================
-
-* kadmind from MIT releases up to and including krb5-1.6.1
-
-* third-party applications calling the RPC library included in MIT
- releases up to and including krb5-1.6.1
-
-FIXES
-=====
-
-* The upcoming krb5-1.6.2 release, as well as the upcoming krb5-1.5.4
- maintenance release, will contain fixes for this vulnerability.
-
-Prior to that release you may:
-
-* apply the patch
-
- This patch is also available at
-
- http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2007-004-patch.txt
-
- A PGP-signed patch is available at
-
- http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2007-004-patch.txt.asc
-
-*** src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gssapi.c (revision 20015)
-- --- src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gssapi.c (local)
-***************
-*** 149,154 ****
-- --- 149,156 ----
- rqst->rq_xprt->xp_auth = &svc_auth_none;
-
- memset((char *) &call_res, 0, sizeof(call_res));
-+ creds.client_handle.length = 0;
-+ creds.client_handle.value = NULL;
-
- cred = &msg->rm_call.cb_cred;
- verf = &msg->rm_call.cb_verf;
-*** src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_unix.c (revision 20015)
-- --- src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_unix.c (local)
-***************
-*** 64,71 ****
- char area_machname[MAX_MACHINE_NAME+1];
- int area_gids[NGRPS];
- } *area;
-! u_int auth_len;
-! int str_len, gid_len;
- register int i;
-
- rqst->rq_xprt->xp_auth = &svc_auth_none;
-- --- 64,70 ----
- char area_machname[MAX_MACHINE_NAME+1];
- int area_gids[NGRPS];
- } *area;
-! u_int auth_len, str_len, gid_len;
- register int i;
-
- rqst->rq_xprt->xp_auth = &svc_auth_none;
-***************
-*** 74,80 ****
- aup = &area->area_aup;
- aup->aup_machname = area->area_machname;
- aup->aup_gids = area->area_gids;
-! auth_len = (u_int)msg->rm_call.cb_cred.oa_length;
- xdrmem_create(&xdrs, msg->rm_call.cb_cred.oa_base,
auth_len,XDR_DECODE);
- buf = XDR_INLINE(&xdrs, (int)auth_len);
- if (buf != NULL) {
-- --- 73,81 ----
- aup = &area->area_aup;
- aup->aup_machname = area->area_machname;
- aup->aup_gids = area->area_gids;
-! auth_len = msg->rm_call.cb_cred.oa_length;
-! if (auth_len > INT_MAX)
-! return AUTH_BADCRED;
- xdrmem_create(&xdrs, msg->rm_call.cb_cred.oa_base,
auth_len,XDR_DECODE);
- buf = XDR_INLINE(&xdrs, (int)auth_len);
- if (buf != NULL) {
-***************
-*** 84,90 ****
- stat = AUTH_BADCRED;
- goto done;
- }
-! memmove(aup->aup_machname, (caddr_t)buf, (u_int)str_len);
- aup->aup_machname[str_len] = 0;
- str_len = RNDUP(str_len);
- buf += str_len / BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT;
-- --- 85,91 ----
- stat = AUTH_BADCRED;
- goto done;
- }
-! memmove(aup->aup_machname, buf, str_len);
- aup->aup_machname[str_len] = 0;
- str_len = RNDUP(str_len);
- buf += str_len / BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT;
-***************
-*** 104,110 ****
- * timestamp, hostname len (0), uid, gid, and gids len (0).
- */
- if ((5 + gid_len) * BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT + str_len > auth_len) {
-! (void) printf("bad auth_len gid %d str %d auth %d\n",
- gid_len, str_len, auth_len);
- stat = AUTH_BADCRED;
- goto done;
-- --- 105,111 ----
- * timestamp, hostname len (0), uid, gid, and gids len (0).
- */
- if ((5 + gid_len) * BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT + str_len > auth_len) {
-! (void) printf("bad auth_len gid %u str %u auth %u\n",
- gid_len, str_len, auth_len);
- stat = AUTH_BADCRED;
- goto done;
-
-REFERENCES
-==========
-
-This announcement is posted at:
-
- http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2007-004.txt
-
-This announcement and related security advisories may be found on the
-MIT Kerberos security advisory page at:
-
- http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/index.html
-
-The main MIT Kerberos web page is at:
-
- http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/index.html
-
-CVE: CVE-2007-2442
-http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-2442
-
-CVE: CVE-2007-2443
-http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-2443
-
-CERT: VU#356961
-http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/356961
-
-CERT: VU#365313
-http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/365313
-
-ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
-===============
-
-We thank McAfee, Inc. for the initial notification. Wei Wang of
-McAfee Avert Labs discovered these vulnerabilities.
-
-DETAILS
-=======
-
-CVE-2007-2442: The function gssrpc__svcauth_gssapi() in
-src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gssapi.c declares an automatic variable "creds"
-of type auth_gssapi_creds. This type includes a gss_buffer_desc
-(which includes a pointer to void used as a pointer to a buffer of
-bytes). If gssrpc__svcauth_gssapi() receives an RPC credential with a
-length of zero, it jumps to the label "error", which executes some
-cleanup code. At this point, the gss_buffer_desc in "creds" is not
-yet initialized, and the cleanup code calls xdr_free() on "creds",
-which then attempts to free the memory pointed to by the uninitialized
-"value" member of the gss_buffer_desc.
-
-Exploitation of freeing of invalid pointers is believed to be
-difficult, and depends on a variety of factors specific to a given
-malloc implementation.
-
-CVE-2007-2443: The function gssrpc__svcauth_unix() in
-src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_unix.c stores an unsigned integer obtained from
-IXDR_GET_U_LONG into a signed integer variable "str_len".
-Subsequently, it checks that "str_len" is less than MAX_MACHINE_NAME,
-which will always be true of "str_len" is negative, which can happen
-when a large unsigned integer is converted to a signed integer. Once
-the length check succeeds, gssrpc__svcauth_unix() calls memmove() with
-a length of "str_len" with the target in a stack buffer.
-
-This vulnerability is believed to be difficult to exploit because the
-memmove() implementation receives a very large number (a negative
-integer converted to a large unsigned value), which will almost
-certainly cause some sort of memory access fault prior to returning.
-This probably avoids any usage of the corrupted return address in the
-overwritten stack frame. Note that some (perhaps unlikely) memmove()
-implementations may call other procedures and thus may be vulnerable
-to corrupted return addresses.
-
-REVISION HISTORY
-================
-
-2007-06-26 original release
-
-Copyright (C) 2007 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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diff --git a/crypto/krb5/MITKRB5-SA-2007-005.txt
b/crypto/krb5/MITKRB5-SA-2007-005.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 3c57824..0000000
--- a/crypto/krb5/MITKRB5-SA-2007-005.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
------BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
-Hash: SHA1
-
- MIT krb5 Security Advisory 2007-005
-
-Original release: 2007-06-26
-Last update: 2007-06-26
-
-Topic: kadmind vulnerable to buffer overflow
-
-Severity: CRITICAL
-
-CVE: CVE-2007-2798
-CERT: VU#554257
-
-SUMMARY
-=======
-
-The MIT krb5 Kerberos administration daemon (kadmind) is vulnerable to
-a stack buffer overflow.
-
-Exploitation of overflows of stack buffers is known to be simple. We
-have received a proof-of-concept exploit which may invoke a shell, but
-we believe that this exploit is not publicly circulated.
-
-This is a bug in kadmind in MIT krb5. It is not a bug in the Kerberos
-protocol.
-
-IMPACT
-======
-
-An authenticated remote user may be able to cause a host running
-kadmind to execute arbitrary code.
-
-Successful exploitation can compromise the Kerberos key database and
-host security on the KDC host. (kadmind typically runs as root.)
-Unsuccessful exploitation attempts will likely result in kadmind
-crashing.
-
-AFFECTED SOFTWARE
-=================
-
-* kadmind from MIT releases up to and including krb5-1.6.1
-
-FIXES
-=====
-
-* The upcoming krb5-1.6.2 release, as well as the upcoming krb5-1.5.4
- maintenance release, will contain fixes for this vulnerability.
-
-Prior to that release you may:
-
-* apply the patch
-
-This patch has the patch in MITKRB5-SA-2007-002 as a prerequisite.
-The krb5-1.6.1 and krb5-1.5.3 releases already contains the
-prerequisite patch.
-
- This patch is also available at
-
- http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2007-005-patch.txt
-
- A PGP-signed patch is available at
-
- http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2007-005-patch.txt.asc
-
-*** src/kadmin/server/server_stubs.c (revision 20024)
-- --- src/kadmin/server/server_stubs.c (local)
-***************
-*** 545,557 ****
- static generic_ret ret;
- char *prime_arg1,
- *prime_arg2;
-- - char prime_arg[BUFSIZ];
- gss_buffer_desc client_name,
- service_name;
- OM_uint32 minor_stat;
- kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
- restriction_t *rp;
- char *errmsg;
-
- xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
-
-- --- 545,558 ----
- static generic_ret ret;
- char *prime_arg1,
- *prime_arg2;
- gss_buffer_desc client_name,
- service_name;
- OM_uint32 minor_stat;
- kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
- restriction_t *rp;
- char *errmsg;
-+ size_t tlen1, tlen2, clen, slen;
-+ char *tdots1, *tdots2, *cdots, *sdots;
-
- xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
-
-***************
-*** 572,578 ****
- ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
- goto exit_func;
- }
-! sprintf(prime_arg, "%s to %s", prime_arg1, prime_arg2);
-
- ret.code = KADM5_OK;
- if (! CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) {
-- --- 573,586 ----
- ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
- goto exit_func;
- }
-! tlen1 = strlen(prime_arg1);
-! trunc_name(&tlen1, &tdots1);
-! tlen2 = strlen(prime_arg2);
-! trunc_name(&tlen2, &tdots2);
-! clen = client_name.length;
-! trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
-! slen = service_name.length;
-! trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
-
- ret.code = KADM5_OK;
- if (! CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) {
-***************
-*** 590,597 ****
- } else
- ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT;
- if (ret.code != KADM5_OK) {
-! log_unauth("kadm5_rename_principal", prime_arg,
-! &client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
- } else {
- ret.code = kadm5_rename_principal((void *)handle, arg->src,
- arg->dest);
-- --- 598,612 ----
- } else
- ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT;
- if (ret.code != KADM5_OK) {
-! krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
-! "Unauthorized request: kadm5_rename_principal, "
-! "%.*s%s to %.*s%s, "
-! "client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s",
-! tlen1, prime_arg1, tdots1,
-! tlen2, prime_arg2, tdots2,
-! clen, client_name.value, cdots,
-! slen, service_name.value, sdots,
-! inet_ntoa(rqstp->rq_xprt->xp_raddr.sin_addr));
- } else {
- ret.code = kadm5_rename_principal((void *)handle, arg->src,
- arg->dest);
-***************
-*** 600,607 ****
- else
- errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle ? handle->context : NULL,
ret.code);
-
-! log_done("kadm5_rename_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
-! &client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
- }
- free_server_handle(handle);
- free(prime_arg1);
-- --- 615,629 ----
- else
- errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle ? handle->context : NULL,
ret.code);
-
-! krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
-! "Request: kadm5_rename_principal, "
-! "%.*s%s to %.*s%s, %s, "
-! "client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s",
-! tlen1, prime_arg1, tdots1,
-! tlen2, prime_arg2, tdots2, errmsg,
-! clen, client_name.value, cdots,
-! slen, service_name.value, sdots,
-! inet_ntoa(rqstp->rq_xprt->xp_raddr.sin_addr));
- }
- free_server_handle(handle);
- free(prime_arg1);
-
-REFERENCES
-==========
-
-This announcement is posted at:
-
- http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2007-005.txt
-
-This announcement and related security advisories may be found on the
-MIT Kerberos security advisory page at:
-
- http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/index.html
-
-The main MIT Kerberos web page is at:
-
- http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/index.html
-
-CVE: CVE-2007-2798
-http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-2798
-
-CERT: VU#554257
-http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/554257
-
-ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
-===============
-
-We thank iDefense for the initial notification. iDefense credits an
-anonymous discoverer.
-
-DETAILS
-=======
-
-The kadmind code which performs the principal renaming operation
-passes unchecked string arguments to a sprintf() call which has a
-fixed-size stack buffer as its destination. These strings are the old
-and new principal names passed to the rename operation. The attacker
-needs to authenticate to kadmind to perform this attack, but no
-administrative privileges are required because the vulnerable code
-executes prior to privilege verification.
-
-REVISION HISTORY
-================
-
-2007-06-26 original release
-
-Copyright (C) 2007 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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diff --git a/crypto/nss/DETAILS b/crypto/nss/DETAILS
index f4372e6..c354a0f 100755
--- a/crypto/nss/DETAILS
+++ b/crypto/nss/DETAILS
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
SPELL=nss
- VERSION=3.11.5
+ VERSION=3.11.7
SOURCE=$SPELL-$VERSION.tar.gz
SOURCE_DIRECTORY=$BUILD_DIRECTORY/$SPELL-$VERSION
-
SOURCE_URL[0]=http://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/security/nss/releases/NSS_3_11_5_RTM/src/$SOURCE
+
SOURCE_URL[0]=http://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/security/nss/releases/NSS_3_11_7_RTM/src/$SOURCE
WEB_SITE=http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/
ENTERED=20030919
-
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:12d96063fa119f2da47c1bb187e939d5d2ca18533e92941ecda71b5bdd44861d4fdd38b5af43d5e7fdbd0fb66bb7a32e9042a455a10be87e1b24c4ba6495783a
+
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:29495bed6e3a3e96f4553b4ba235616f335658f6a2f0ea3e8572b57fc3ccf95fc6adda61fdbba83f2b5fca5bc461d423acaffb8d1b88791f10012216cf9366fe
LICENSE[0]=MPL
LICENSE[1]=GPL
LICENSE[2]=LGPL
diff --git a/crypto/nss/HISTORY b/crypto/nss/HISTORY
index d618df4..65f2da2 100644
--- a/crypto/nss/HISTORY
+++ b/crypto/nss/HISTORY
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+2007-07-17 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
+ * DETAILS: 3.11.7
+
2007-03-08 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
* DETAILS: 3.11.5
diff --git a/crypto/openct/DETAILS b/crypto/openct/DETAILS
index 91ca89b..f30ec85 100755
--- a/crypto/openct/DETAILS
+++ b/crypto/openct/DETAILS
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
SPELL=openct
- VERSION=0.6.11
+ VERSION=0.6.12
SOURCE=${SPELL}-${VERSION}.tar.gz
SOURCE_DIRECTORY=${BUILD_DIRECTORY}/${SPELL}-${VERSION}
SOURCE_URL[0]=http://www.opensc-project.org/files/${SPELL}/${SOURCE}
-
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:26a665cce1587a82d482d7b8e96c5f7912f1c9bdf8ebeb2f955954ad8e362b41708295f7240eb2217b1eb9952db2beb4b6ffb4a44e74db7685f56b66c658df44
+
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:0514cfa0acd9024c8fbe662ec574c75e32645f75590a04e13e7c4a3bcc656c0d39be8c1e68be06f92ef5b7e6c8d73b11c1a1153e031d56c717a3f108c99fc8a8
# SOURCE_GPG="gurus.gpg:${SOURCE}.sig"
LICENSE[0]=BSD
diff --git a/crypto/openct/HISTORY b/crypto/openct/HISTORY
index bf85827..0f59104 100644
--- a/crypto/openct/HISTORY
+++ b/crypto/openct/HISTORY
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+2007-07-17 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
+ * DETAILS: 0.6.12
+
2006-11-23 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
* DETAILS: 0.6.11
diff --git a/crypto/opensc/DETAILS b/crypto/opensc/DETAILS
index c5ae9fd..1617d08 100755
--- a/crypto/opensc/DETAILS
+++ b/crypto/opensc/DETAILS
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
SPELL=opensc
- VERSION=0.11.2
+ VERSION=0.11.3
SOURCE=${SPELL}-${VERSION}.tar.gz
SOURCE_DIRECTORY=${BUILD_DIRECTORY}/${SPELL}-${VERSION}
SOURCE_URL[0]=http://www.opensc-project.org/files/opensc/${SOURCE}
-
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:f4974f75034b676f203a6ad1cfdb1fb3284ec928708392b894f39e7fa6f163b35fc7d332e02c3ab2f148f53e2b639ad4d304ccf995e76547e8ac2d3724b1b465
+
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:c8914f50023ffa26a1663ff24eddb88d1f59761d26e308490f96edb4514776622124acca1a9b1dc4040e7be7d177f358119af8d2c2d62ec6f59d0a85a9034337
# SOURCE_GPG="gurus.gpg:${SOURCE}.sig"
WEB_SITE=http://www.opensc-project.org
diff --git a/crypto/opensc/HISTORY b/crypto/opensc/HISTORY
index b31190f..07333e0 100644
--- a/crypto/opensc/HISTORY
+++ b/crypto/opensc/HISTORY
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+2007-07-17 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
+ * DETAILS: 0.11.3
+
2007-05-11 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
* DETAILS: 0.11.2
diff --git a/libs/nspr/DETAILS b/libs/nspr/DETAILS
index 2935061..6662309 100755
--- a/libs/nspr/DETAILS
+++ b/libs/nspr/DETAILS
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
SPELL=nspr
- VERSION=4.6.6
+ VERSION=4.6.7
SOURCE=$SPELL-$VERSION.tar.gz
SOURCE_DIRECTORY=$BUILD_DIRECTORY/$SPELL-$VERSION
SOURCE_URL[0]=ftp://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/nspr/releases/v$VERSION/src/$SOURCE
WEB_SITE=http://www.mozilla.org/projects/nspr/
ENTERED=20050512
-
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:aa7ba3390fb37f5e278f03da1d3b80b336e8f4b5b5223ca6d1a55ff96b9055f846913ffaa95adb122cc9b1746457c82ac34340cb2aeb907d2b634f25ee33b881
+
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:9f8cf1d5cd3b290857743bd50e194214271e9d64fd86ee96190750e4455150c7471c3e7c35c6047a082105ba64560ff8406c466d62ef609f89cab69f1c6e2264
# SOURCE_GPG=gurus.gpg:$SOURCE.sig:WORKS_FOR_ME
LICENSE[0]=MPL
PATCHLEVEL=0
diff --git a/libs/nspr/HISTORY b/libs/nspr/HISTORY
index 883e213..3c619a7 100644
--- a/libs/nspr/HISTORY
+++ b/libs/nspr/HISTORY
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+2007-07-17 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
+ * DETAILS: 4.6.7
+
2007-03-08 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
* DETAILS: 4.6.6
diff --git a/utils/multitail/DETAILS b/utils/multitail/DETAILS
index 33499c2..8494eba 100755
--- a/utils/multitail/DETAILS
+++ b/utils/multitail/DETAILS
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
SPELL=multitail
- VERSION=5.0.5
+ VERSION=5.2.0
SOURCE=${SPELL}-${VERSION}.tgz
SOURCE_DIRECTORY=${BUILD_DIRECTORY}/${SPELL}-${VERSION}
SOURCE_URL[0]=http://www.vanheusden.com/${SPELL}/${SOURCE}
-
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:f837d0dba3d205b6bd6a799a38e699c22e9fb0d946d3adddfa76bbc40a125746ef707ef3235c43a96a0fa1131ca80e951e131c0cd05d18c0832c2e2f15bfe103
+
SOURCE_HASH=sha512:d5287c0f4ff747f023487507289221de86a22655a39896d1b89176c86226b0722ee7d93cb41524de9947b1fae3b81dc843edcc67a99f3ae016b563152325aaa1
WEB_SITE=http://www.vanheusden.com/multitail/
ENTERED=20060105
LICENSE[0]=GPL
diff --git a/utils/multitail/HISTORY b/utils/multitail/HISTORY
index 8bd0af3..d977290 100644
--- a/utils/multitail/HISTORY
+++ b/utils/multitail/HISTORY
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+2007-07-17 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
+ * DETAILS: 5.2.0
+
2007-06-11 Ladislav Hagara <hgr AT vabo.cz>
* DETAILS: 5.0.5
- [SM-Commit] GIT changes to master grimoire by Ladislav Hagara (afa79f9b7f8c284444aa1dbde1eb1afff2b113d4), Ladislav Hagara, 07/17/2007
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