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["Christian Stalberg" <cstalberg AT develop.net>]

----- Original Message -----
From: <sevoy AT quark.cpsr.org>
To: <cpsrusfor AT quark.cpsr.org>
Sent: Wednesday, November 15, 2000 3:48 PM
Subject: CPSR Answers Computer-Based Voting Technology Questions


>
> Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR), a public
> interest organization that focuses on the benefits and risks to society of
> computer technology, offers the following answers to frequently asked
> questions about computer-based voting technology.
>
> Q:  Why do vote counting systems produce different totals when the ballots
are
> recounted?  Shouldn't machine counts and recounts of ballots produce
> repeatable, reliable results?
>
> A:  Many people have wondered why a computerized vote-counting system
> would have any significant inaccuracies. Some have publicly speculated
that
> such variation must be the result of deliberate human action. Some people
> believe that computerized counts will always be more accurate than human
> counts, because of inevitable "human error."
>
> However, computerized vote-counting systems are complex, prone to
> several kinds of error. Well-designed vote-counting systems minimize these
> errors. Some systems, particularly older systems, are not so
well-designed,
> and are more prone to error. To illustrate this problem, we will describe
> some reliability problems with the oldest type of computerized
> ballot still in use, the Vote-O-Matic(tm). This system was once very
popular
> and is still used in many places, including 15 Florida counties: Broward,
> Collier, Dade, Duval, Highlands, Hillsborough, Indian River, Lee, Marion,
> Osceola, Palm Beach, Pasco, Pinellas, Sarasota, and Sumpter.
>
> The following describes reliability problems associated with one phase of
> the elections process: gathering ballots and running them through readers.
> Problems may occur in other phases, included materials design and
printing,
> polling place administration, voter education, and vote tally software. By
> focusing on this one phase, we do not imply that the other phases are
> trivial. Conducting elections is demanding work, in all phases. Also, this
> paper focuses on errors. Elections frauds certainly have arisen in the
> history of American politics, but to our knowledge no fraud has been
alleged
> in the ballot counting process for this election. Some level of error is
> inevitable when counting Vote-O-Matic ballots, however.
>
> CPSR has been studying Vote-O-Matic-type vote counting systems for over
ten
> years. Experts, including CPSR's own project personnel, have concluded
that
> the Vote-O-Matic system has inherent accuracy limitations. Furthermore,
> careful manual counting of Vote-O-Matic ballots should always be more
> accurate than machine counts.
>
> The Vote-O-Matic system uses as a ballot the Hollerith punch card, also
> known as a "computer card." This once-common card is roughly 3" by 7",
with
> small rectangular holes. For Vote-O-Matic cards, each hole in the card
> represents a vote for one candidate (or in favor or against a ballot
> measure). The ballot is counted by feeding it, short-side first, into a
> reader. (The card is made with one corner clipped, so that the correct end
> of the card is fed in first.) The reader has lights and sensors. When a
hole
> passes over the sensor, light shines through, and the hole is read as a
> vote.
>
> Hollerith cards were used for the 1890 census, and millions and millions
of
> critical activities between then and the 1970's. Thus, one might expect
the
> Vote-O-Matic system to be extremely reliable. But important differences
> between the standard Hollerith card and the Vote-O-Matic card make the
> Vote-O-Matic far less stable and reliable. There are three main problem
> areas:
>  - ballots
>  - ballot reader machines
>  - what happens when a ballot reader reads a ballot
>
> * Ballots
>
> The ballots use essentially the same card size and hole positions that IBM
> adopted in 1924 soon after they bought Hollerith's company. However, the
> cards are not the same. Hollerith's approach was to punch a hole in a
solid
> piece of paper. Vote-O-Matic cards are pre-punched. Each square "chad" is
> held in place by a small wad of paper fibers at each corner. The vote then
> makes a hole by pushing the chad out with a round stylus. However,
sometimes
> a chad will be partly punched out or will snag on something and be pulled
> out, creating what is known as "hanging chad."
>
> Hanging chad can be attached at one, two, or three corners. Chad attached
at
> one corner are usually torn off by the card reader or in handling. Chad
> attached at two corners are also often torn off, unless the two corners
are
> on the side of the chad that is fed first into the card reader. Then,
often,
> the chad will be forced back into the hole, only to flap open again later.
> chad attached at three corners are also usually forced closed by the card
> reader. Handling the cards can also change the status of hanging chad.
Some
> studies have been done on chad, but there are many independent variable
and
> complicating situations, so the preceding is a generalization.
>
> These pre-punched cards are also reportedly sensitive to changes humidity.
> The reasons have not, to our knowledge, been studied, but it is likely
> because the chad loses and gains moisture faster than the bulk material.
> Thus taking a box of Vote-O-Matic cards from an air-conditioned room to a
> humid evening to another air-conditioned room will have unpredictable
> effects. It may take the cards some time to settle down after the ordeal.
>
> The pre-punches also make the cards less rigid than a normal Hollerith
card,
> and thus more prone to bending. Bent cards often cause problems during
> reading. The trailing edge of the card is uneven, because of tabs from
where
> the write-in tab was detached. The faces of the card are not as smooth as
a
> regular card, again due to the pre-punches.
>
>
> * Ballot Reader Machines
>
> So far as we know, there are no longer any manufacturers of Hollerith card
> readers. High-speed card readers have a lot of precision parts. Existing
> readers must be periodically rebuilt, but many companies no longer exist
and
> the remaining manufacturers, so far as we know, no longer offer
maintenance
> contracts on the units. Elections is about the last market left for
> Hollerith card readers. Elections companies buy up equipment from counties
> as they move away from Vote-O-Matic systems, and sell it jurisdictions
still
> using Vote-O-Matic.
>
> Elections aren't a particularly hard life for a card reader, since a
reader
> is only used for a few days a year. Still, the readers eventually need to
be
> rebuilt, which elections companies do with a dwindling supply of spares,
> hangar queens, and whatever rebuild protocols they devise.
> Still, some parts age more on calendar time than with use. As the readers
> age, they become less reliable and more prone to error and breakdown.
>
>
> * What Happens When a Ballot Reader Reads a Ballot
>
> Ideally, a stack of ballots is sucked one-at-a-time from the input hopper
to
> the output hopper of a card reader, each being counted accurately.
However,
> sometimes two cards are sucked through. This is probably because
> pre-punching makes small ridges on the bottom of the card, and an
identical
> pattern of small troughs on the top. The ridges tend to get caught in the
> troughs. Also, feed mechanisms have to be engineered with consideration of
> the air cushion between the cards, as one moves relative to the other.
This
> air cushion will not have the same properties for Vote-O-Matic cards as
for
> normal cards, due to surface roughness. For whatever reason, misfeeds
> happen.
>
> Hanging chad can flip open and closed. Detached chad can become stuck in
the
> feed path, increasing double feeds and misfeeds. Detached chad can jam two
> cards together, increasing misfeeds. In some machines, detached chad can
jam
> over the light or sensor, causing holes to not be read until the chad
blows
> out of the way. Detached chad can migrate from one card to the next.
>
> Chad that was not detached before, but merely buckled or only detached on
> one corner (which counts as "not an open hole" in many jurisdictions) can
> catch on other cards and become hanging chad or be torn loose.
>
> The read process can be quite traumatic to a Vote-O-Matic card.
>
>
> Q:  Is counting ballots by hand more or less reliable than counting them
by
> machine?
>
> A: A human count of
> Vote-O-Matic cards should almost always produce a significantly more
> accurate result than automated reading. People cannot count cards as
> quickly as a card reader, but a card reader is much more limited than a
> person in how it can handle and read a card. Any damage a card has
sustained
> can confuse a card reader or cause it to malfunction. People are better
able
> to deal with such problems.
>
> Unfortunately, reading a Vote-O-Matic card by machine changes the card.
> Cards that have had one or more trips through a high-speed card reader
will
> appear different to a human reader than they would have when freshly
punched
> by the voter.
>
> Erik Nilsson, an election technology analyst for CPSR, believes that the
> Vote-O-Matic system should be replaced.  "For a quarter century, election
> experts have been calling for the Vote-O-Matic system to be retired.  The
> results of the 2000 election show that it is now time move beyond this
> temperamental antique."
>
>
> Q: Would Internet voting solve this problem?
>
> A: Internet voting is often suggested as a solution to election counting
> problems, but has many problems of its own, for example:
>
> - If people voted from home, it would be very difficult, perhaps
> impossible, to assure that those who vote are who they say they are.
> Someone could vote for one of their family members, for example.
>
> - If people vote from home rather than in a polling place, vote secrecy
and
> privacy could be compromised.  Elections in many democratic societies,
> including the U.S., are based on the promise of secret ballots, where only
> the voter knows who he or she voted for (unless he or she chooses to tell
> others).
>
> - A home-based Internet-based voting system would favor people who have
> computers and Internet connections at home.  Such amenities are not
> possessed by all citizens in the U.S.
>
> - Purely electronic ballots leave no paper trail, so electronic subversion
> of voting records could be difficult or impossible to detect.
>
> - Voting from home could destroy the sense of shared civic responsibility
> and pride that most people clearly feel when they go to an actual polling
> place to vote.
>
> On the other hand, Internet voting could offer the following advantages:
> - Customized presentation of voting choices, for example voter-selected
> font size
> - Reliable vote tabulation
> - Access for the disabled, and rural
> - Can handle large numbers of voters
>
> Computers, of course, can and will be used in elections.  One approach
that
> could provide the advantages without many of the disadvantages would be to
> provide Internet terminals in polling places.  Voters would come to the
> polling place and identify themselves, as they always have.  Vote-O-Matic
> and other outdated, unreliable systems would be replaced by more current
> technology.  Each polling place would have a "manual" backup system on
> site, for when the network connections or computers fail (as they surely
> will) or when a voter is simply unable to understand how to use the
> computer.
>
> A home-based Internet voting system is completely out of the question
until
> access to the Internet in the U.S. is universal.  Until such a time,
> adopting a home-based Internet voting system would be unconstitutional.
> Today we are far from universal access.  For example, in some urban poor
> districts, 14% of households lack even basic phone service, much less
> Internet connections.  On some Indian reservations, the percentage of
> phone-less households is even higher: 40%.
>
> Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility was founded in the early
> 1980s by computer scientists and engineers who were concerned about the
> use of computer technology in military applications, particularly the
Strategic
> Defense, or "Star Wars", Initiative.  In the mid-1980s, the organization
> branched out to include other issues, such as electronic privacy, freedom
of
> speech, and the use of computer technology in elections.
>
> For further information, please visit CPSR's website:
> http://www.cpsr.org/issues/voting.html or contact the CPSR office
> at 650-322-3778  or   cpsr AT cpsr.org to be directed to experts in the area
of
> Internet voting.
>
> Susan Evoy   *   Managing Director
> http://www.cpsr.org/
> Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
> P.O. Box 717  *  Palo Alto  *  CA *  94302
> Phone: (650) 322-3778    *
> Email: evoy AT cpsr.org
>
>
>
>
>