Discussion of all things related to Public Domain

[tom poe <tompoe AT amihost.com>]

Hi, Steve:  This should be of interest to you.  I haven't received a
reply from your department regarding my request for an opportunity to
have you publish an opinion piece submitted some ten days ago.  Please
advise.
Thanks,
Tom Poe
Open Studios
Reno, NV
http://www.studioforrecording.org/

-----Forwarded Message-----

> From: Jon O. <jono AT networkcommand.com>
> To: dmca_discuss AT lists.microshaft.org
> Subject: [DMCA_Discuss] Diebold Inc.
> Date: 12 Sep 2003 17:15:55 -0700
> 
> One of the real future threats of the DMCA in action:
> 
> 
> ----- Forwarded message from Elias <elias AT cse.ucsc.edu> -----
> 
> 
>   Holy election time stories, BatMan! I wonder how/when this will hit 
> major media... Hope none of you have stock in this company.
> 
> Reeling,
> Elias
> 
> -------- Original Message --------
> [...]
> 
> "It doesn't matter who votes, it matters who counts the votes"- Joe Stalin
> 
> DIEBOLD DEMANDS WEB SITES REMOVE SOFTWARE
> AND DAMNING EMAILS, CHARGING COPYRIGHT VIOLATIONS!
> 
> http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/
> DIEBOLD ALERT
> All files yanked by webhost at request of Diebold, Inc.
> 
> A copy of the email is below. I received this 28 hours after the 
> now-vanished files went live.
> 
> While I am not a legal professional in any way, I firmly believe that 
> these files, while copyrighted, carry credible evidence of illegal 
> vote-accessing activity and thus are not covered under the DCMA due to 
> the "dirty hands" defense, which disallows an entity seeking damages in 
> cases involving illegal activities connected to that which is being 
> protected.
> 
> I furthermore adamantly oppose the secrecy and unlawful proliferation of 
> voting machines lacking in an auditable, transparent paper backup trail 
> as mandated by law via the Helping Americans Vote Act. I refuse to stand 
> by and watch our voting rights be subverted, controlled, and ultimately 
> destroyed.
> 
> I will post further updates, should they become available.
> 
> --Zhade
> 
> 
> -- Original message --
> 
> September 11, 2003
> Jennifer Bryan Dragonwind Internet Services 608 Live Oak Drive Cedar 
> Park, TX 78613
> dragonwind AT dragonwind.net <mailto:dragonwind AT dragonwind.net>
> RE: COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
> Ms. Jennifer Bryan,
> We represent Diebold, Incorporated and its wholly owned subsidiary 
> Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (collectively "Diebold"). Diebold is the 
> owner of copyrights in certain software, documentation, and other works 
> of authorship associated with its proprietary electronic voting machines 
> ("Diebold Property"). It has recently come to our clients' attention 
> that you appear to be hosting the following website: 
> www.smashthetrifecta.com <http://www.smashthetrifecta.com> on one or 
> more of your servers, identified as NS1.DRAGONWIND.NET or 
> NS2.DRAGONWIND.NET. This websinte , particularly each of the following 
> pages, includes program and/or data files containing Diebold Property.:
> 
> http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/pimaupgrade.zip
> http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/GEMSIS-1-17-17.ZIP
> http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/GEMSIS-1-17-23.zip
> http://www.coopster.net/Web%20Shares/GEMSIS-1-18-17.zip
> http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/cobb-corrected-100102-backup.zip
> http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/sloprimary030502.zip
> http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/ATL-TSRepair.zip
> 
> Other information posted on these web pages encourages the downloading 
> of Diebold Property from the server and describes how to circumvent 
> passwords and other technological measures that are designed to control 
> access to the Diebold property. The owner of the smashthetrifecta.com 
> website does not have Diebold's consent to use any Diebold Property. 
> These web pages infringe Diebold's copyrights by (1) placing an 
> unauthorized copy of the Diebold Property on the server, (2) making the 
> Diebold property available to third parties to download from the server 
> and authorizing third parties to further infringe our clients' 
> copyrights by downloading and therefore copying Diebold Property, and 
> (3) encouraging and assisting in the circumvention of copyright 
> protection systems. The purpose of this letter is to advise you of our 
> clients' rights and to seek your agreement to the following:
> 
> 1. To stop using and to immediately delete any Diebold Property from all 
> computer systems used by you, or operated under your control, and to 
> confirm having done so in writing;
> 
> 2. To confirm, in writing, that you have no backup copies of any Diebold 
> Property;
> 
> 3. To cease making Diebold Property available on your server and to 
> cease providing the opportunity for any third parties to download, and 
> thereby copy, Diebold Property.
> 
> The value of property protected by copyright arises in large part from 
> the right to control access to and use of such property. Hosting a 
> website which encourages all visitors to copy and use the Diebold 
> Property without permission from or accounting to Diebold is a clear 
> infringement of Diebold's rights in the Diebold Property. Our clients 
> reserve their position insofar as costs and damages caused by the 
> unauthorized reproduction and distribution of Diebold Property are 
> concerned, and their right to seek injunctive relief to prevent further 
> unauthorized reproduction and distribution of Diebold Property, pending 
> your response to this letter. We suggest you contact your legal advisors 
> to obtain legal advice as to your position. We await your response 
> within 24 hours.
> 
> Respectfully,
> 
> Nancy L. Reeves
> Walker & Jocke 231
> South Broadway Medina, Ohio 44256
> 
> -- Walker & Jocke
> http://www.walkerandjocke.com
> 
> 
> Jim March's email response to Diebold
> Ms. Reeves,
> 
> I read with interest your statement of alleged copyright/IP infringement 
> against the owner of the "smashthetrifecta" site:
> 
> http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/
> 
> and:
> 
> http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=104&topic_id=323463&mesg_id=323463
>  
> <http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=104&topic_id=323463&mesg_id=323463>
>  
> 
> 
> The purpose of this missive is to inform you of several basic facts:
> 
> 1) I am the individual who provided that site's owner with the files in 
> question;
> 
> 2) The files are up on other sites in addition to that one; I fully 
> expect you'll try bullying them into submission too;
> 
> 3) Ultimately, this will not work because I *will* continue to 
> distribute them under "fair use" principles.
> 
> I take this stance after repeated consultation with legal counsel. Allow 
> me to elaborate:
> 
> Copyright law cannot be used to hide evidence of a crime. Diebold has 
> clearly committed so many legal violations at this point, that "unclean 
> hands" principles apply in spades.
> 
> a) Diebold had, on their website and available for public download, a 
> copy of an elections data file created at 3:31pm on the day of the March 
> 5th 2002 primary elections in San Luis Obispo County. There is no 
> possible reason for that file to have been in Diebold's possession. 
> Under California law, it is illegal to release elections data before the 
> close of the election. I suggest consulting with the SLO County 
> Registrar, Julie Rodewald, to confirm the authenticity of this file 
> which I provided her.
> 
> b) California Elections Code 19205(c) prevents the Calif Secretary of 
> State from certifying electronic voting systems which are subject to 
> tampering. There is ZERO practical security at all on the GEMS data 
> management system. Anybody with a copy of MS-Access can alter voting 
> data, passwords and audit trails at will, without leaving any trace. 
> Worse, there is a runtime edition of MS-Access shipped on every GEMS box 
> (central vote-count computer system as used with all Diebold Elections 
> Systems products), which would allow exactly the same alterations from a 
> script executed via a dial-in connection through the RAS server and 
> Digiboard from a Touchscreen terminal, Optical Scan terminal or standard 
> PC/Laptop. We can prove that Diebold would have enough access to the 
> GEMS box in mid-election to "booger the vote" by their possession of the 
> SLO county data file referred to above.
> 
> c) Internal memos slipped to activists BY DIEBOLD INSIDERS (the "1.8gigs 
> of data" first referred to in Wired magazine) and in my possession show 
> that Diebold field tech support staffs noticed teh "zero security under 
> MS-Access" issue literally years ago, and deliberately kept it quiet 
> from county elections officials and state certification boards. This 
> constitutes pure criminal conspiracy.
> 
> d) The same internal memos reveal a widespread pattern of installing and 
> using UNcertified versions of the various programs, both at the 
> terminals and central vote-count box (running the "GEMS" app and related 
> components).
> 
> e) While purporting to sell an application that operates under high 
> security standards, your clients have displayed technical incompetence 
> in security matters at a level seldom seen outside of a "Dilbert" comic 
> strip.
> 
> To recap: your clients have set out to secretly rig elections. They have 
> installed features into their software making it deliberatel open to 
> tampering in ways that defeat the usual "spot recount of random 
> precincts" procedures of honest local elections officials rely on.
> 
> Your clients actions are literally horrifying, evidence of nothing less 
> than a coup attempt in progress. You will be hearing from metomorrow by 
> phone; if it is your client's intent to sue me, I will facilitate that 
> at the earliest possible convenience, in order to rape them in discovery 
> and depositions and annihilate them in court.
> 
> You see, Ms. Reeves, sometimes when you push people around, you run into 
> somebody who's had about enough and isn't going to back down./p>
> 
> I hate bullies. With a passion. I am going to *enjoy* our future 
> interactions.
> 
> I guarantee you your clients won't.
> 
> Jim March
> 
> Blind Carbon Copy to: a *whole* lotta people. :)
> 
> :
> : FLASHBACK: Wired.com Aug 7th, 20003
> : "Following an embarrassing leak of its proprietary
> : software over a file transfer protocol site last January,
> : the inner workings of Diebold Election Systems have again
> : been laid bare. A hacker has.... made off... with
> : Diebold's internal discussion-list archives, a software
> : bug database and more software. The unidentified attacker
> : provided Wired News with an archive containing 1.8 GB of
> : files apparently taken March 2 from a site referred to by
> : the Ohio-based company as its "staff website."
> : http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,59925,00.html
> :
> 
> : Scoop.co.nz has obtained internal mail messages from Diebold
> : Election Systems which clearly and explicitly confirm
> : security problems in the GEMS vote counting software that
> : were highlighted in reports published on Scoop.co.nz and
> : widely elsewhere in July.
> 
> : FULL STORY
> : http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0309/S00106.htm
> 
> : In the internal mail Diebold Election Systems principal
> : engineer R&D Ken Clark - then working for Global Election
> : Systems before Diebold took the company over - responded to
> : an internal query over a security problem. The official
> : certification laboratory responsible for assessing the
> : voting technology company software's robustness had noticed
> : a problem, and a staff member was seeking Clark's advice.
> 
> : The "GEMS Access database" that Finberg refers to is
> : a piece of computer software which is loaded onto county
> : election supervisors computers. It is responsible for
> : tallying votes from county precinct voting booths, these
> : results are typically modemed into the central computer.
> 
> : Significantly this software is responsible for tallying all
> : votes, optical scan, touchscreen and absentee ballots. It
> : was this software that Scoop initially reported was all too
> : easy to hack in its July 8th report from Bev Harris.
> 
> : In reply to Finberg's query Clark responded with an
> : astonishingly frank posting which clearly confirms most of
> : the worst aspects of the GEMS system security outlined by
> : Harris in her July report.
> 
> : FULL STORY
> : http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0309/S00106.htm
> 
> : EMAIL 1
> : To: "support"
> : Subject: alteration of Audit Log in Access
> : From: "Nel Finberg"
> : Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 23:31:30 -0700
> : Importance: Normal
> 
> : Jennifer Price at Metamor (about to be Ciber) has indicated
> : that she can access the GEMS Access database and alter the
> : Audit log without entering a password. What is the position
> : of our development staff on this issue? Can we justify
> : this? Or should this be anathema?
> 
> : Nel
> 
> : EMAIL 2
> : To: "support"
> : Subject: RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access
> : From: "Ken Clark"
> : Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 09:55:02 -0700
> : Importance: Normal
> 
> : Its a tough question, and it has a lot to do with perception.
> : Of course everyone knows perception is reality.
> 
> : Right now you can open GEMS' .mdb file with MS-Access, and
> : alter its contents. That includes the audit log. This isn't
> : anything new. In VTS, you can open the database with
> : progress and do the same. The same would go for anyone
> : else's system using whatever database they are using. Hard
> : drives are read-write entities. You can change their
> : contents.
> 
> : Now, where the perception comes in is that its right now very
> : *easy* to change the contents. Double click the .mdb file.
> : Even technical wizards at Metamor (or Ciber, or whatever)
> : can figure that one out.
> 
> : It is possible to put a secret password on the .mdb file to
> : prevent Metamor from opening it with Access. I've
> : threatened to put a password on the .mdb before when
> : dealers/customers/support have done stupid things with the
> : GEMS database structure using Access. Being able to
> : end-run the database has admittedly got people out of a
> : bind though. Jane (I think it was Jane) did some fancy
> : footwork on the .mdb file in Gaston recently. I know our
> : dealers do it. King County is famous for it. That's why
> : we've never put a password on the file before.
> 
> : Note however that even if we put a password on the file, it
> : doesn't really prove much. Someone has to know the
> : password, else how would GEMS open it. So this technically
> : brings us back to square one: the audit log is modifiable
> : by that person at least (read, me). Back to perception
> : though, if you don't bring this up you might skate through
> : Metamor . [i.e. certification -nFormed]
> 
> : There might be some clever crypto techniques to make it even
> : harder to change the log (for me, they guy with the
> : password that is). We're talking big changes here though,
> : and at the moment largely theoretical ones. I'd doubt that
> : any of our competitors are that clever.
> 
> : By the way, all of this is why Texas gets its sh*t in a knot
> : over the log printer. Log printers are not read-write, so
> : you don't have the problem. Of course if I were Texas I
> : would be more worried about modifications to our electronic
> : ballots than to our electron logs, but that is another
> : story I guess.
> 
> : Bottom line on Metamor is to find out what it is going to take
> : to make them happy. You can try the old standard of the NT
> : password gains access to the operating system, and that
> : after that point all bets are off. You have to trust the
> : person with the NT password at least. This is all about
> : Florida, and we have had VTS certified in Florida under the
> : status quo for nearly ten years.
> 
> : I sense a loosing battle here though. The changes to put a
> : password on the .mdb file are not trivial and probably not
> : even backward compatible, but we'll do it if that is what
> : it is going to take.
> 
> : Ken
> 
> : EMAIL 3
> : To: "support"
> : Subject: RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access
> : From: "Nel Finberg"
> : Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 14:48:16 -0700
> : Importance: Normal
> 
> : Thanks for the response, Ken. For now Metamor accepts the
> : requirement to restrict the server password to authorized
> : staff in the jurisdiction, and that it should be the
> : responsibility of the jurisdiction to restrict knowledge of
> : this password. So no action is necessary in this matter, at
> : this time.
> 
> : Nel
> 
> 
> http
> 
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