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  • From: julian AT openit.de (Julian v. Bock)
  • To: "Wyatt Draggoo" <wyatt AT draggoo.com>
  • Cc: sm-discuss AT lists.ibiblio.org
  • Subject: Re: [SM-Discuss] Source Mage Developer Key Signing
  • Date: Wed, 02 Apr 2003 11:54:26 +0200

Hi

>>>>> "WD" == Wyatt Draggoo <wyatt AT draggoo.com> writes:

WD> Not that I'm opposed to key-signing, but isn't the point of a
WD> key-signing party to physically presesnt some sort of evidence you
WD> are who you are?

Yes, it is. Such signatures wouldn't be trustworthy.

That is the reason why the list of requirements for the sourcemage cvs
access does not make that much sense. Only very few people would be
able to physically meet each other and verify which Erics they are.

Furthermore, this does not create a trust path to the hoster of the
cvs server.

Julian
>From Geoffrey.Derber AT Trinity.Edu Wed Apr 2 09:45:36 2003
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Subject: Re: [SM-Discuss] Source Mage Developer Key Signing
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| Not that I'm opposed to key-signing, but isn't the point of a key-signing
| party to physically presesnt some sort of evidence you are who you
are? We
| has one at a local LUG where everyone brought their passports and drivers'
| licenses, and each verified the others, and *then* signed their keys.
|
That's why when you sign it you indicate how much checking you did, for
this you could leave it at 0 which is pretty much a 'no comment' answer,
more appropriate might be a 1, for no checking at all, or if you manage
to figure out some method for verification, a 2 for casual checking but
not very rigorous might be appropriate.

The 3 level would be for the passport, drivers license, etc, which we
would never have.

Geoff
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