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  • From: Lawrence London <lfljvenaura@gmail.com>
  • To: permaculture <permaculture@lists.ibiblio.org>
  • Subject: [permaculture] Mekong River, the battle of the dams | Cronache Internazionali | Notizie dal Mondo
  • Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2015 23:46:39 -0400

[This is a really great essay!]

Mekong River, the battle of the dams | Cronache Internazionali | Notizie
dal Mondo
http://www.cronacheinternazionali.com/mekong-river-the-battle-of-the-dams-8280

Asia - Pacifico
<http://www.cronacheinternazionali.com/category/asia-pacifico>, English
section <http://www.cronacheinternazionali.com/category/english-section>
Mekong
River, the battle of the dams Di Federico Giamperoli
<http://www.cronacheinternazionali.com/author/federicogiamperoli>
16 January 2015 Tags: Cambodia
<http://www.cronacheinternazionali.com/tag/cambodia>, China
<http://www.cronacheinternazionali.com/tag/china>, Dam
<http://www.cronacheinternazionali.com/tag/dam>, Laos
<http://www.cronacheinternazionali.com/tag/laos>, Mekong
<http://www.cronacheinternazionali.com/tag/mekong>, Vietnam
<http://www.cronacheinternazionali.com/tag/vietnam>, Xayaburi
<http://www.cronacheinternazionali.com/tag/xayaburi>

Large-scale hydroelectric projects under construction on the river course
are triggering public concerns regarding their impact on environment and
fisheries. They are also escalating tensions among countries of the whole
Indochina

If it is not the equivalent of the Nile in Egypt, it’s pretty close. *Mekong
River* and its hydrographical basin have been one of the natural cradles of
civilization in the Indochina peninsula. For thousands of years, it has
been not only the most important source of water within the region, but
also the most important trade route in an area laden with jungles and
mountains, where even man-made roads have a hard time to make their way.

But the importance of this river is still priceless today for two further
and connected reasons. With more than *850 species of fish *identified
in[image:
mekongmap] its waters, aquatic bio-diversity of Mekong basin is second in
the world only to Amazon River in Brazil. This makes the Mekong one of the
most productive basins *for fresh water fishing and aquaculture*. It’s not
only an invaluable natural reserve, but also an irreplaceable source of *food
*for the whole Indochina and in particular for Laos, Cambodia and southern
Vietnam, where the great river ends its run to the sea through a huge delta.

But today, this natural resource is caught in the middle of the clash
between the needs of industrialization and conservation efforts. The Mekong
and its tributaries store one of the greatest *hydroelectric potentials* in
the world, estimated in *27.000 Megawatts on its lower basin* (Laos,
Cambodia and Vietnam) and up to *30.000 on the higher one*, mainly on
Chinese soil. This enormous source of energy, is fueling a race to *build
dams,* mainly by *China and Laos*. But it is also rising the concerns of
the countries downstream – *Cambodia and Vietnam* – as well as the
ones of *local
populations*, for the drainage of the vital resources brought by the river.

Mekong and its hydrographical basin already have a comprehensive number of *29
hydroelectric dams.* It’s an explosive growth from 1990, when they were
only *five*, and it is destined to grow further, both in number and in
dimension of the barrages. The difference with the past is that these new
projects are focused *on the mainstream* Mekong, not on tributaries. China
alone has four barrages under construction on the upper course, to be
completed by 2017, for a total of 6.000 Megawatts of hydro-power installed.
In 2014, Beijing has concluded the construction of the biggest
hydroelectric plant ever built on the river: the Nuozhadu Barrage, which is
able to produce 5.800 MW of power on its own.

But while China has five great hydroelectric barrages previously completed,
until now the other countries of the basin have built dams only on its
tributaries. This will not last long. Over the next years, *Laos will
represent the bulk of hydroelectric installation* on the mainstream Mekong.
By 2020,* ten dams* are to be built (two where the river marks the border
between Laos and Thailand), for a total capacity of almost *10.000 MWs *of
power

This abrupt escalation of Laotian projects seems also fostered by a *precise
political-economic strategy* adopted in Vientiane. Landlocked, poor and
badly connected in term of infrastructures, Laos is building its way to
development by becoming *a regional hub of production and export of
electricity.* The country is attracting huge foreign investment in these
projects right from the countries who will be greater beneficiaries of
hydro-power installed. Most of energy produced, indeed, will be exported to*
Thailand, but also to Vietnam and southern China. *

This is the case of *Xayaburi Dam*, by now the most contested dam under
construction. This project is the result of an agreement between the
Government of Laos and the *Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand*.
Realization of the dam has been subcontracted to Thai construction firm
Karnchang Public Company Limited, while credit is being provided by four
Thai banks, including the State-Owned Krung Thai Bank. Once completed, the
power plant *will export to Bangkok 95% of its 1.300 MWs of electric output*
.

In 2011-12, the beginning of its construction marked the start of a season
of *unprecedented diplomatic clashes* on the management *of Mekong waters*.
Not only Cambodia, but also Vietnam, previously in favour of Laotian dam
projects for its energy needs, turned against its realization. Both
countries expressed strong concerns about the impact of this dam on food
and water coming from Mekong. The Xayaburi Dam came under accusation due to
the risks of *displacement on river’s fauna*. According to *International
Rivers *environmentalist forum, this barrage could block the migration of *23
to 100 species of fish* toward the downstream. Among them, the *Mekong
Giant Catfish,* which is already threatened by overfishing. The prospect of
nine further barrages on Laotian course of Mekong can only deepen these
concerns.

*These are not far-fetched concerns*. Lower Mekong basin alone provides *4,5
million tons* of aquatic products every year, including *2,6 million tons
of fish* and other freshwater animals. The economic value of these
activities fluctuates between *4 and 7 billion dollars per year*. But is
not just a matter of economy, *it’s a matter of food.* Aquaculture, in its
various forms, is still practiced by about *40 million of people in lower
basin* four countries. In the poorest areas, a pure monetary value would
totally underestimate its weight, because fishing is still practiced there *as
livelihood activity* or as supplement of the daily diet. Aquatic products
make up from *40 to 80% of animal protein* consumed every day by rural
populations.

International disputes concerning the fair exploitation of Mekong were an
issue already in the 1950s, when the dismantling of French colonial rule
left three new independent States and Thailand to compete for its
resources. In 1957, the *Mekong Committee *was created, a framework of
cooperative development tasked with promoting irrigation and hydroelectric
projects to be commonly used by Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.
The initiative was strongly backed by United States as an economic cement
between friendly regimes, against the advance of communist forces. But the
realization of such projects was hampered by the massive *displacement of
population,* required to make space for such hydroelectric basins. Finally,
the escalation of the Second *Indochina War *caused all the projects out of
Thailand to collapse, apart from the little dam on Nam Ngum River – a
tributary of Mekong-, which was completed in Laos in 1971. Any potential of
mutual cooperation on Mekong waned until the early 1990s.

In 1995 the *Mekong River Commission* was finally formed, also thanks to
the contemporary development of *ASEAN*. The Commission, based in Vientiane
and comprehensive of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam, rejected the
logic of massive hydroelectric project of the 1960s, assuming *mutual use
of resources as a key factor*. MRC also adopted a *stricter coordination
rule on dam building. *While the construction of barrage on tributaries was
left to the discretion of single countries, the realization of dams on the
mainstream of the Mekong was submitted to a mechanism of prior consultation
with MRC partners: the *Procedures for Notifications, Prior Consultation
and Agreement* (*PNPCA*).

Under 1995 Agreement, any MRC country involved in this kind of
hydroelectric project is not only required to notify its intentions well in
advance, but also to discuss the realization within MRC partners and *reach
a common consensus* about the work to be carried out. However, this
regulatory power remained *ambiguous*. First, the “consensus” mentioned
must to be *unanimous*, and second, the Commission *did not advocate a
definitive right to veto* on dam projects. The second gap of MRC, just as
happened for the *Committee*, was to leave China out of the agreement, the
country where Mekong arises and flows for one fourth of its path.

The results of MRC ambiguity has become evident on last years. The
exclusion of Beijing from the Agreement has left China free *to pursue
unilaterally its hydroelectric projects,* without any obligation to talk
with other basin States. Within the dispute on Xayaburi Dam, the rule of
unanimity proved inconsistent. The building of the dam was briefly blocked
in spring 2012, to resume the talks of PNPCA. During these talks, Laotian
desires to pursue the project were backed by Thailand, with Cambodia and
Vietnam on the opposite side. *No agreement was reached* and *Laos
unilaterally resumed the construction* on November 2012, without having
presented any correction to the original project.

But, in recent months, it was the entire architecture of MRC to look
threatened, in front of another controversial Laotian project: the *Don
Sahong Dam.* The construction of this small 260 MWs plant, commissioned to
the Malaysian firm Mega First Corporation, was announced by Vientiane
in *November
2013*, just two months before the work were intended to begin. This
circumstance aroused the ire of Cambodia and Vietnam, which accused Laos of
not complying even with the terms of previous notice imposed by PNCPA. The
answer from Laos has further exacerbated the discussion. According to the
Laotian Minister for Energy, Viraphon Viravong, the dam did not require a
notice to the MRC, as it is destined to occupy only *one arm of the river*
and not the whole course. The construction site is in fact the “*Rapids of
Si Pha Don*” (literally, the 4,000 islands), a series of rapids and small
islands a few miles from the Cambodian border, in the province of
Champassak, where Mekong splits into several arms before recomposing
further downstream.

Not only the Governments of downstream countries, *but also NGOs have
objected *on these statements. The arm of the river to be dammed is the
deepest among the rapids and the only one capable of *carrying both mass
migration of fish and the alluvial deposits.* Without these materials,
the *river
delta* in Vietnamese territory could lose part of its riverbed,
becoming *vulnerable
to marine erosion and the entry of salt water.* A real threat to the
Vietnamese agriculture, which in the humid lowlands of the delta has the
most important region of *rice cultivation*. Again, Laos has blocked the
work on the site and agreed to resume PNCPA talks. But similarly to what
happened in the Xayaburi Dam case, the first round of meeting, held in
Vientiane on December 16, ended in a* stalemate*.

At first glance, the dispute on the Mekong dams looks like *a contest
propelled by the different levels of political and economic power* of the
countries involved. The richest and most powerful countries (China and
Thailand), hungry for energy, crush the interests of the poorest economies
(Vietnam and Cambodia), still reliant on the natural resources of the
river, with the help of those who control the flow of Mekong itself
(Laos). *Instead,
the reality is much more complex.*

Resolutely deployed in defense of its hydroelectric projects, Laos itself
could be the country *most at risk:* *70% of Its rural households* (2.9
million people) *rely on subsistence fisheries* or additional income from
fish sale. Thailand, the greater industrial beneficiary of Laotian energy
export, has to face public protests, and even lawsuits, against the dams by
fishers and farmers, supported by NGOs. However, also the “victims” of this
contention,* are not* exactly* exempt from responsibilities.* First,
Vietnam and Cambodia should be also among the beneficiaries of the Laotian
export of energy. But, above all, the same *Cambodia is planning the
construction of two dams *on the lower course of the Mekong by *2021*: a
980 MWs hydroelectric power plant, in Stung Treng province, and a bigger
one (2200 MWs), near the town of Sambor.

The true – and dangerous – logic seems to be the one of cascade *“beggar
thy neighbour” policies. *As the waters of Mekong are increasingly trapped
by the dams upstream, downstream countries are encouraged *to do the same
to trap and exploit as much remained water as possible*, with even more
serious consequences for the nations* further downstream*.

Pessimistic experts of geopolitics have stated that if the war of the
recent past have been for oil, the war of the future will be for water. As
with the Jordan River, between Palestine and Israel, and Tigris and
Euphrates, between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, more responsible diplomacies and
business communities have to emerge on Mekong River, to disprove these
predictions.

Federico Giamperoli – *fedegiampe@libero.it <fedegiampe@libero.it>*




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