[SM-Security] Vulnerability in Bugzilla 3.0.4, 3.1.4, and 2.22.4

David Kowis dkowis at shlrm.org
Thu Aug 28 21:42:32 EDT 2008


Synopsis
========
Local files on the server can be attached to a bug (making them publicly 
visible) when importing bugs with --attach_path

Background
==========
Bugzilla is a Web-based bug-tracking system, used by a large number of 
software projects.

Description
===========
When importing bugs using importxml.pl, the --attach_path
option can be specified, pointing to the directory where
attachments to import are stored. If the XML file being
read by importxml.pl contains a malicious
<data encoding="filename">../relative_path/to/local_file</data>
node, the script follows this relative path and attaches the
local file pointed by it to the bug, making the file public.
The security fix makes sure the relative path is alwaysignored.
Most Bugzilla installations will not be vulnerable, as
they do not use --attach_path with importxml.pl.
(In fact, most installations don't use importxml.pl at all.)

Affected packages
=================
Bugzilla in test and stable.

Resolution
==========
All bugzilla users should upgrade to the latest available version:
# scribe update
# cast -c bugzilla

References
==========
[ 1 ] Bugzilla Security Notice
http://www.bugzilla.org/security/2.22.4/

[ 2 ] Sourcemage Bug #14964
http://bugs.sourcemage.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14694


-- 
David Kowis

www.ronpaul2008.com - Ron Paul for President!
www.sourcemage.org  - SourceMage GNU/Linux

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