John M. Tait
jmtait at jmt.prestel.co.uk
Tue Dec 1 15:59:02 EST 1998
Further to Ward's suggestion re: Lenski:
Although I haven't got hold of Lenski yet, I gather from other writers'
references to him that his main argument is regarding MOICEUQHNAI in the
sense of causing a stigma of adultery as a result of divorce, rather than
causing adultery as a result of re-marriage. This does not seem to affect
the point I am concerned with, because in either case the PAREKTOS clause
would seem to be a logical exception (in this case, it would be illogical
to say that the husband had caused the wife to accrue a stigma of adultery
if she in fact had committed adultery) rather than a legal exemption.
Incidentally, this also contra-indicates the interpretation of PAREKTOS as
"notwithstanding" or similar. It would make no sense to say that the
divorcing husband is the cause either of the wife committing adultery, or
of having the stigma of adultery, notwithstanding that she has already, and
really, committed adultery. The rationale of this interpretation seems to
depend on the presupposition that the parektos clause is an exemption.
John M. Tait.
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